Influenza CSL and court martial of ALP MP

Chapter XXI – The War Ends
Feb, 1919-July, 1921] THE WAR ENDS 1073
The greatest strain on the discipline of the force actually came when transports reached Australia and, sometimes through the detection of a single case of influenza, were quarantined although the epidemic was already beginning to spread throughout the country. It is said that by delaying the epidemic the quarantine probably saved Australia a heavy toll of life. 92 The officers, ships’ captains and quarantine authorities organised what amusements they could and the trial was generally borne with astonishing good humour. 93
92 This is discussed in Vol. III of the Official Australian Medical History, now being prepared for publication.

In Chapter XV – Medical Problems in Australia

We read
"The application of maritime quarantine from the 17th of October 1918 was an endeavour to prevent the entry of that type of influenza. During the seven months from October 1918 to April 1919 the quarantine service dealt with 149 uninfected vessels and 174 infected vessels, with a total personnel of 81,510 including 1,102 actual patients."

We also read
“Under its control, besides quarantine and the Australian Institute of Tropical Medicine, came the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories. The laboratories were themselves a very important outcome of the First World War. The following account of their institution is authoritative:

Towards the end of 1914, it became apparent that supplies of biological products especially diphtheria and tetanus anti-toxins, would be available in Australia only in limited quantities, if at all. The war situation had produced such demands on European and American supplies for British and French use that Australia was in danger of being left without any. Accordingly, after consultation with one or two people interested, Dr. Cumpston recommended to the Minister that the Government itself should immediately set about production so that it should never be caught in the some position again. This was agreed to and Dr. Cumpston was given a fairly free hand as to expenditure and staff. The building was opened for work while the war was still in progress; the first contribution on any large scale was the preparation of large quantities of influenza vaccine to meet the epidemic of 1918-19. The development of these laboratories proceeded with many initial difficulties, but with such ultimate success until, during the Second World War, they have supplied not only all Australia’s own requirements, both for the services and for civil needs, and for troops abroad as well as at home, but also most of the needs of the Government of New Zealand, Hong Kong, Malaya, Dutch East Indies and India.

93 In one case, that of the transport Somali, which arrived at Adelaide on Jan. 28, serious trouble took place. No case of influenza had occurred since the ship left Fremantle. The troops believed that quarantine at Adelaide would be avoided by continuous submission to treatment; but after two days’ delay, although an informal message was received that the South Australians were to be taken off and the ship allowed to go on, this was not carried out. On the 30th the troops threatened to take control of the ship. One of the leaders, a member of the Federal Parliament, Gnr. G. E. Yates, was afterwards tried by court martial and spent a month in detention, but through the death of his father was released before his full term ended.

At the AEC we read G E Yates (ALP) 1914-19 and G E Yates (ALP) 1922-31

He was and remains a mysterious figure..

Wilder-Neligan, Maurice (1882 - 1923)
He was and remains a mysterious figure, save for the brief years of his military achievement.

From the landing on Gallipoli on 25 April he was in his element.

After recovering, he took part in desperate fighting at Bullecourt in May 1917 and in the 3rd battle of Ypres. For brief periods that year he was acting commanding officer of the 9th Battalion and of the 10th. Promoted lieutenant-colonel, he returned to the 10th on 30 June as its commander; 'within a few months [he] infused into that battalion a special eagerness'. His determined and imaginative training prepared it for the battle of Polygon Wood in September—with brilliant results.


To C. E. W. Bean he was 'a restless and adventurous spirit', 'an impetuous, daredevil officer but free of the carelessness with which those qualities are often associated'. His eccentricities were famous and were often shown in the embarrassing way he treated his officers, but much was forgiven so masterly a commander. If the rank and file cursed him, they also trusted him.

Kim il? Too many blonde jokes?

Kim Jong-il - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Too many blonde jokes? He is rumoured to like Swedish blondes.
Oh, if MacArthur had been allowed total victory in Korea. He wanted to defeat communism in East Asia. He wanted to bomb Chinese bases in Manchuria and block Chinese ports. President Truman and his military advisers were concerned World War Three would start. Now World War Three from sick Kim?

the Beguine Begin, May 23, 1910

Artie Shaw
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
May 23, 1910, New York, New York - December 30, 2004, Thousand Oaks, California

no-man’s-land was strewn with Turks

ANZAC TO AMIENS [19th-24th May 1915
Chapter IX – Holding on at Anzac
But no-man’s-land was strewn with Turks. Of the 42,000 - two old and two fresh divisions - that attacked, 10,000 were hit, 3000 (it is said) being killed.

General Bridges, born 150 years ago today

William Throsby Bridges, was born 150 years ago today. He as a Australian General was shot by a Turkish sniper.
Chapter IV – The Problem of Monash Valley
15th May, 1915] PROBLEM OF MONASH VALLEY 129
As he went up the road with Colonel White and Lieutenant Casey (his A.D.C.) they met Major William Glasgow, 75 of the 1st Light Horse Regiment, with some of his men on their way down. “Be careful of the next corner,” he said, “ I have lost five men there to-day.’’ Such warnings, which were constantly heard by anyone visiting the trenches, were usually little heeded. But this particular officer was not one who would give idle advice. When, therefore, they reached a traverse 200 yards below Chauvel’s headquarters, and some men behind the next barrier advised them to run to it, General Bridges, to the surprise of his companions, adopted the suggestion. His ordinary practice had been to expose himself without regard for danger, laughing down at his staff when they took cover, and asking “what they were getting down there for?” But he had apparently begun to realise that this impunity could not continue. 76
On this day, probably guessing from a certain vague tension in the valley that the danger was real, he acted upon the advice tendered The party ran three or four times between barriers, until they reached the one below Steele’s Post. Behind this was the dressing-station of Captain Thompson of the 1st Battalion. After talking a few minutes and lighting a cigarette Bridges went on, Thompson warning him to be careful. The general’s long legs disappeared in the scrub round the traverse, and the others were preparing to follow, when there was some sort of stir, and Thompson ran out to find Bridges lying with a huge bullet-hole through his thigh. Both femoral artery and vein had been cut, and, though Thompson instantly stopped the bleeding, the loss of blood had been very great. As they brought the general back into the shelter of the traverse, strangely changed from the bronzed healthy man who had passed a few seconds before, he said weakly, “ Don’t carry me down-I don’t want any of your stretcher-bearers hit.”
Colonel White had the traffic in the gully stopped, so that it should be clear to the Turks that the only movement was

75 Afterwards Maj.-Gen Sir T. W Glasgow, commanding 1st Aust. Div.
76 A few days previously, when a shrapnel shell had burst very near, Col Howse. one of his few intimate friends, had said, General, you’ll be caught if you go risking any more of those.” Nex:t day, when Col. White during a burst of shell-fire advised his chief not to "give the Turks the chance they wanted," Bridges had consented to take cover till the shelling was over.

130 THE STORY OF ANZAC [15th May, 1915

the carrying of a wounded man, and then the party moved slowly to the Beach. The Turks, whether by accident or by a forbearance which they sometimes showed, did not fire upon it. Bridges was taken at once to the hospital ship Gascon. But the whole blood-supply to the limb had been cut off, and nothing could save his life except complete amputation at the thigh, an operation which, it was considered, to a man of his years, must prove fatal. Before the Garcon left for Alexandria he knew he was dying. “Anyhow,” he said to Colonel Ryan, “anyhow, I have commanded an Australian Division for nine months.” He died before the ship reached port. His body was brought to Australia 77 and buried on the hill above the military college at Duntroon, which he had founded. Bridges’ habit of exposing himself to danger had made it from the first unlikely that he would survive many months: of fighting. Had he done so, it is probable that he would have emerged the greatest of Australia’s soldiers, as he was certainly the most profound of her military students. His powerful mind and great knowledge were supported by outstanding moral and physical courage, and also by a ruthless driving force, rare in students. Only in Haig and Allenby did Australians meet any commander whose forcefulness equalled that of Bridges. His defect as a leader-the inability to display those qualities which would make the ordinary man love and follow him-was finding its compensation in the conspicuous bravery with which, since the Landing, he had won the admiration of the troops.
Upon Bridges’ death the command of the 1st Australian Division temporarily passed, in accordance with the general expectation of those at Anzac, to Brigadier-General H. B. Walker, of the 1st Infantry Brigade, an officer who, by his directness, his fighting qualities, and his consideration for his men, had in a few weeks much endeared himself to the troops. This promotion left vacant the command of the 1st Brigade. Most of the battalions of the division were at this time commanded by officers who were either rather too old to possess the necessary vigour, or had been newly promoted in place of those killed, wounded, or unequal to the test of war.

77 Upon a suggestion made in Parliament by the Hon. Littleton E. Groom

Anzac E. L. Margolin, b. Central Russia

Chapter IV – The Problem of Monash Valley
9th-10th May, 1915] PROBLEM OF MONASH VALLEY 107
In consequence Colonel Cannan despatched to him Lieutenant Harwood, with thirty men of the 16th, and ordered patrols to be sent by the centre party towards the left and vice versa. As no word of these came back, Major Margolin 41 was next sent with a further thirty under orders to enter Frank Armstrong’s trench and advance along it to the left, so as to link up. But on reaching Armstrong’s trench Margolin found it so crowded that there was no room for his men, who had to lie down outside. Stumbling upon Harwood’s party lying in the same manner in the old No-Man’s Land, he set it to assist in digging the central communication trench. Then, since his own men were being uselessly killed, he returned to Cannan, and was instructed to withdraw them. Searching the space between the trenches with a faithful assistant,

41 Lieut.-Col. E. L. Margolin, D.S.O. Merchant: of Collie, W. Aust., b. Bielgorod, Central Russia, 26 March. 1875.

108 THE STORY OF ANZAC [10th May, 1915
Signaller Silas, he succeeded in getting forty men of the 16th back to Quinn's.

Anzac N T Svensen b Larvik, Norway

Chapter IV – The Problem of Monash Valley
9th May, 1915] PROBLEM OF MONASH VALLEY 105
On the declivity beside several dugouts was a heap of spoil, and above it the mouth of a tunnel. into which Corporal Tickner fired, but without drawing a reply. According to one account, after the valley had been cleared of Turks and picqueted, a messenger reached Armstrong warning him that he was too far advanced. At all events he reassembled his party and returned to the Australian line. The raid had no doubt crushed the enemy’s local defence system upon that flank of Quinn’s. The Queenslanders had lost few men, and eventually, reinforced by some of Lieutenant Svensen’s 34 men from the right trench of Quinn’s, helped to garrison its proper section of the new line, while Svensen strung out other men across No-Man’s Land to dig a communication trench from the right of Quinn’s to the captured position.

34 Lieut. N T Svensen, 15th Bn Draughtsman, of South Brisbane, b Larvik, Norway, 17 Sept , 1878.

...a solitary Turk with a number of waterbottles..

May,1915] CHANGE TO TRENCH-WARFARE 47
Men of the 1st Brigade were sapping across one small gap on Maclaurin’s where on May 7th there remained five yards to be completed. A further negligible interval at the “nick’’ of Wire Gully remained to the end of the campaign filled only with barbed wire. 5 South of this, across the 400 Plateau, the trenches were now continuous.
In the last of the four sections, the Right, which began immediately south of the 400 Plateau and ran along Bolton’s Ridge to a point above the sea, the troops, as on the extreme left, had been comparatively uninterrupted, and their trenches were consequently deep and secure. A few posts on the steep

5 On a day in May men sitting in their dugouts above Bridges’ Road (the valley on the Anzac side of this gap) saw a solitary Turk with a number of waterbottles slung round him standing in this nick above them and looking down on the scene as if dazed. He had evidently been sent to bring water to the Turkish trenches. and, making his way up the wrong gully had found himself in the Australian lines. He dived back and escaped down the enemy’s side of the hill, a few shots ringing after him.

See Vol I , pp. 350-1.
Chapter XVI – The 3rd Brigade on the“400 Plateau”
From the Razorback the side of the plateau curved northward in front of the 10th to the point where it joined the Second ridge. Braund’s Hill, a minor back-jutting spur of the Second ridge, shut in the valley on the north. Along this valley ran a path, which had evidently been used by the Turks from inland for reaching the shore. The path wound very steeply up to a curious nick in the skyline at the northern corner of the valley-head.

48 THE STORY OF ANZAC [May, 1915

slope above the shore connected the trench-line with a wire entanglement upon the beach, which formed the extreme right flank.
The enemy had at this stage approached the Anzac line very closely at Russell’s Top and in the two Central Sections, but especially in that of Monash’s brigade-the Left Central.

2nd-6th May, 1915

Chapter I – The Struggle for Krithia
4 THE STORY OF ANZAC [2nd-6th May, 1915
Returning to Anzac, Birdwood sent for Bridges and Godley, the commanders of his two divisions, and asked each to withdraw at once from the line his most effective brigade. Bridges chose the 2nd, 5 commanded by Colonel M’Cay. In the N.Z. & A Division the only brigade which could possibly be sent was that of the New Zealand infantry. Although the Otago Battalion had been heavily engaged in the previous night’s attack on Baby 700, the brigade still numbered 2493; the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, the strength of which had been given on May 2nd as 3,430, was after that fight estimated at no more than 1,811.
The order to withdraw the troops had already been sent out and the Otago Battalion and part of the Canterbury, just emerging from the battle, had been directed to the Beach, when the move was postponed by G.H.Q. The twenty guns, however, were sent on May 4th, and on the same day the arrival of the Fusilier brigade of the 42nd (East Lancashire Territorial) Division, for which he was waiting, enabled Hamilton to determine that the great attempt should be launched on the morning of May 6th. The reinforcement from Anzac was therefore ordered to move south on the night of the 5th. “I am sending my two best brigades,” Birdwood telegraphed.
It was obviously important that the Turks should have no inkling of this transfer, since it would lead them to guess both that the Anzac line had been weakened and that an attack was impending at Helles. It was therefore planned that the troops should embark immediately after nightfall and, making the two-hour’ sea-journey during the dark, should be in bivouac at Helles before daylight. By careful arrangement the brigades, with the bearer sub-divisions” of their respective field ambulances, were relieved, rationed, equipped, and at dusk concentrated beside their boats and lighters at specially marked embarking-points. Unfortunately the destroyers and fleet-sweepers 6 which were to carry them were delayed by heavy seas, although Anzac Cove was as usual protected from the wind. On the Beach, since fires were impossible, the troops sat shivering until midnight, when the
5 The 1st had 2.874 men-as against 2,568 of the 2nd-but its commander Gen Walker was newly-appointed and a British officer, whereas M'Cay was an Australian whose leadership, Bridges thought had been considerably improved by the past week‘s experience in the field. Moreover, M’Cay’s brigade was less disorganised than the 1st
6 Swift packet-boats from England temporarily fitted for mine-sweeping with the fleet.
6th May, 1915] STRUGGLE FOR KRITHIA 5
New Zealanders began to embark. It was plain daylight before the last of the fleet-sweepers carrying the Australians left for Helles.

At the beginning of May, 1915

Chapter I – The Struggle for Krithia
At the beginning of May, 1915, both the forces which had landed a week earlier on the Gallipoli Peninsula had secured a foothold. But neither had approached its objective. Even the positions intended to be reached by the covering forces, namely, Achi Baba at Helles and the “Third” ridges at Anzac, had not been attained. The British had gradually advanced two miles, nearly half of the projected first stage; the Anzac troops remained where all except a few advanced elements had from the earliest hours been ordered to entrench-that is to say, on the “Second” ridge. Of this the main prominence, Baby 700, had been lost in the fierce struggle following the Landing, and the enemy had gained a footing on the almost equally important 400 Plateau and on all parts of the Second ridge between the two. The result was that, while the British foothold at Helles might at the beginning of May be considered secure, that at Anzac, where the enemy dominated the centre of the position, was still tactically unsafe.