Germany: The first postwar Christmas

CHAPTER XXIII Winter The Season of Despair

[photo: FAMILY MEAL, mostly of potatoes.]

The first postwar Christmas, dismal though it was, was not quite as bad as it might have been. The worst specimen of a goose for the holiday dinner cost at least a thousand Reichsmarks, when one could be had at all; and one black marketeer made a huge profit selling cans of old Wehrmacht sauerkraut relabeled goulash. The Frankfurter Rundschau described the scene in that city:
A few stalls stand on the wet pavement of the main square in the midst of the ruins. Cards are for sale, also a few red and blue pencils, some cardboard toys, a few pitiful things made out of wood, and lots of trashy and expensive ornaments. The old Frankfurter Santa Claus and his arks full of wooden animals is distant as a dream.
In Stuttgart, the Christmas selection consisted mostly of small and expensive wooden toys and small quantities of powder, lipstick, and oilless face creams. A lighted Christmas tree atop the Stuttgarter Zeitung building, the first seen in the city since 1938, stood out painfully amidst the dark ruins.15 The weather, however, was warm and springlike. The Frankfurter Rundschau reminded its readers what such weather meant in terms of survival and recalled also that the previous year had been different in two respects: the weather on 24 December had been cold and the sky clear, and a hail of bombs had fallen on the city. This year at least "no mother needs to pick up her child in haste and run to the cellar with it."
The holiday was, in fact, not completely barren. Third Army reported "a certain aura of good feeling" associated with the season, and the food offices released extra rations of sugar and flour. Throughout the zone, the troops gave Christmas parties for children. In Landkreis Wetzlar, for example, the local detachment and the occupation troops gave a bag of cookies and a candy bar to each of the several thousand school children. In Bad Aibling the officers and men of the guard for Prisoner of War Enclosure No. 26 distributed chocolate and candy in the town schools. In Heilbronn, the US soldiers furnished candy, the prisoners of war in the local stockade contributed handmade toys, and the military government detachment recorded with satisfaction "the presence of a traditional Christmas tree in even the humblest cellar home." Some detachments noted, however, that the Germans who came around to them with holiday greetings were often small-time Nazis hoping to ingratiate themselves, while those who had nothing to fear or nothing to gain stayed away.

"Air Raid on Pearl Harbor. This is no drill." 1941

Pearl Harbor December 7 1941
Chronology Of The Attack
From The Deck Logs Of The Vessels Moored At Pearl Harbor December 7 1941
Compiled For The Pearl Harbor, Court Of Inquiry Hearings
0743 Local hostilities commenced with air raid on Pearl.
O757 PATRON 21 First Bomb dropped near VP-22 Hangar. Message order broadcast to all ships present "AIR RAID P. H. X THIS IS NOT DRILL" (a similar message was sent by CinCPac).
0812 OUTGOING Hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl.
0812 Task Force 8 received message from CinC Air Raid on Pearl Harbor. This is no drill. This time about coincided with expected arrival ENTERPRISE planes at Pearl. Task Force Comdr. first concerned that planes were assumed to be unfriendly by harbor defenses. It was not until subsequent dispatches were received that it was realized hostilities with Japan had begun.
1322 Opnav To Mardet Tientsin. Com 15, Mardet AM Emb, Peiping Astnavatt
Shanghai, Rdo Wake, Navatt Chungking, Johnston Is, Rdo Guam, Palmyra, Com 16, Rdo Tutuila, HOPKINS: This confirms air raid by Japan on Oahu at 1800 today followed by declaration of war by Japan against US and Great Britain.
For those on the west side of the international date line, the "date which will live in infamy" came on 8 December 1941. Few responsible military or naval men had believed that the Japanese would be able to strike in more than one place. The number and diversity of their attacks took the Allies completely by surprise. During the early morning hours of the 8th, Japanese naval and air forces struck almost simultaneously at Kota Bharu in British Malaya (0140), Singora, just across the border in Thailand (0305), Singapore (0610), Guam (0805), Hong Kong (0900), Wake, and the Philippines.
The duty officer at Asiatic Fleet headquarters in the Marsman Building in Manila on the night of 7-8 December (Philippine time) was Lt. Col. William T. Clement, USMC. At 0230 of the 8th (0800, 7 December, Pearl Harbor time), the operator at the Navy station intercepted the startling message, "Air Raid on Pearl Harbor. This is no drill." Recognizing the technique of the sender, an old friend stationed at Pearl Harbor, the operator brought the message to Colonel Clement. Within a half hour, it was in Admiral Hart's hands. He broadcast the news to the fleet immediately, and then, with his chief of staff, hurried to his office.
Shortly after 0330 General Sutherland received the news of the Pearl Harbor attack, not from the Navy but from commercial broadcasts. He passed the news on to MacArthur over the private wire to the general's penthouse apartment in the Manila Hotel, then notified all commanders that a state of war existed with Japan.

the Ghost of Christmas Past

With Christmas present approaching.
At A Christmas Carol by Charles Dickens we can read:
"Who, and what are you?" Scrooge demanded.

"I am the Ghost of Christmas Past."
While at Chapter 4 – Organised for Total War, April 1942–June 1943 we can read:

"A SEASON OF AUSTERITY” 271

I am no believer in the fear psychology (Prime Minister Curtin said in a national broadcast) but if we do not strip ourselves to save our country, then the enemy will do it with a ruthless efficiency and with a maximum of misery that can have a counterpart only in the imagination. Consider our fate should he be victorious! What will we have then? Today Port Moresby and Darwin are the Singapores of Australia. If those two places fall, then, inevitably, we are faced with a bloody struggle on our soil when we will be forced to fight grimly, city by city, village by village, until our fair land may become a blackened ruin. We will fight. Our record is proof of that, but what of the cost? Therefore, the Australian Government says that the cost must be paid now —not to an invading enemy —but in equipping our fighting men so that they will hold Port Moresby and Darwin; so that they will hold this Australian bastion for democracy and, finally, wrest the initiative from the enemy.

Our fate is in the balance as I speak to you. The Battle of the Solomons is not only vital in itself, but, as part of a continuing action which will go on, it represents a phase of the Japanese drive in which is wrapped up invasion of Australia. At this stage it would be mischievous to conjecture as to whether the outcome of the Battle of the Solomons will give us a further breathing space or whether it will mean disaster, followed swiftly by a direct Japanese threat and thrust at our shores .But I do tell you that we are faced with an enemy of great power, devilish ingenuity and regimented efficiency. We cannot expect to rely on strokes of luck nor to survive mistakes. The Japanese are waging war to the death. We seven millions of Australians in this, the place where are gathered the greatest number of British-speaking people south of the Equator, must, individually, wage a war to the death, just as though we were, man for man, engaged in bloody combat.

The Government, therefore, cannot permit anything to stand in the way of placing the nation on a full war footing and it must, by every means in its power, bring those sections ...who are thoughtless of what is involved to a salutary realisation of the situation. To that end, Cabinet has made decisions which will be the Government's lead in the austerity campaign which is opened as from tonight.

The specific measures which were ushered in by this account of the war situation were intended to restrict horse and dog races, raise the tax on all entertainments, reduce drinking, smoking and the eating of expensive meals, check black-marketing and take away the glamour from the "artificial life" led by those people whose doings are described as social news.

It was plain, however, that the Prime Minister had planned an eloquent speech for other reasons than to announce such decisions. His main objective was "to bring the people to the realisation that only by an austere way of life can we muster our national strength to the pitch required for victory". He read out a pledge which he asked every Australian to take in order that they might strip themselves of "every selfish, comfort-able habit, every luxurious impulse, every act, word or deed that retards the victory march". The pledge, in six short paragraphs, was an emotional recital rather than a precise commitment — a promise to fight and work as Australians had never fought or worked before, to cut from life "every luxury, every relaxation, every temptation to slack", to forget privileges, comfort and rest and, throwing everything into the struggle, let nothing block the way to the attainment of victory.

Against the fervency of his appeal and the rigidity of the code he imposed on himself, the various executive acts by which the austerity campaign was enforced on the people may seem banal. They were rules to curb spending and perhaps make the citizens worthier in the process. The first action was against racing. The purpose was both to check the orgy of betting that had come with the increased circulation of money and to cut down the claims of the racing industry on men, supplies and transport. The State Governments were asked to use the power given to them by the Commonwealth to restrict further the number of horse-racing, greyhound coursing and trotting meetings. None of the States did so. Curtin himself, after hearing representatives of the racing clubs and resisting various pressures, brought down proposals to the Full Cabinet. The final decision was to have races only on Saturdays, to have one raceless Saturday each month, to limit the number of events on a race programme, and to restrict the publication of form, comments and tips. The big holiday and carnival meetings in each State were exempted from the regulations. 5 Later, restrictions on the transport of racehorses and greyhounds were introduced. Attempts, with an extremely limited success, were also made to check off-the-course betting by "bootleg bookmakers". The war effort of race promoters and racegoers, however, was chiefly in the endurance of difficulty to maintain their customary habits. The next attempt was to reduce "the disproportionate expenditure on drink". A previous attempt had been made by the Minister for War Organisation of Industry to save manpower, conserve materials and reduce excessive drinking and drunkenness by restricting the production of beer and other alcoholic beverages by amounts of from 28 per cent to 331-per cent according to the class of residential area, and by limiting the hours of trading in liquor to seven a day. The Minister for Trade and Customs made a note on a file that this attempt cost his department the time spent in handling 6,038 letters, 8,150 telephone calls and 5,280 interviews and did not stop excessive drinking. Production had been cut in the April-June quarter of 1942 from 9,373,000 gallons to 7,201,000 gallons a month. There were mixed views in the party whether the restriction should continue but the Full Cabinet had decided to adhere to it on 3rd August 1942, and at a Premiers' Conference on 10th August the State Governments undertook to reduce trading hours by at least another hour a day, to impose drastic penalties on hotel-keepers for serving men in uniform with excessive quantities of bottled liquor, to exclude women from public bars, to make drinking in parks and public places unlawful an d to tighten up the laws in other respects . Curtin's austerity proposals were to use the deterrent effect of a substantial increase in excise and to inform the States that if their measures did not succeed the Commonwealth Government would introduce other measures.
The attempts to restrict drinking were resisted and evaded. They saved some manpower and materials in the breweries but may have lost manpower not only to black marketing but by reason of the fact that drinkers either waited for the beer to come "on” or, when it was "on " hastened to the pub so as not to miss their share. They made it difficult and in some cases impossible for some sections of the community to obtain liquor. They made no perceptible difference to excessive drinking, and drunkenness in public places continued to be a common feature of Australia n city life throughout the war. The political pressure in respect of both racing and drinking was constant and unvaried. It came from those who had ownership in the two industries; it came from the customers. It came from trade unions and from the wealthy. Wartime experience makes it clear that beer and betting mean more than anything else in life to a considerable number of Australians. Meals in public eating places were limited to three courses in order to check luxury spending. The newspapers were asked to give up printing social news or photographs of persons not engaged in war activities. Penalties for breaches of the prices regulations were made stiffer. A Black Marketing Bill was introduced into Parliament in September. Its title was not well chosen for what it did was to provide more drastic punishment for all the major offences already constituted under the National Security Regulations dealing with prices, liquid fuel, rationing of goods and services, the restriction of stocks and the control of production an d the acquisition of primary products. It was really a measure designed t o check any form of excessive profit-making or evasion of the controls mentioned. It was passed with the blessing of both parties

And at Chapter 4 – Organised for Total War, April 1942–June 1943 we can see another Scrooge.
"Mr. Dedman Scrooge has banned Christmas advertising, the words 'Yuletide' and
'festive season' and the employment of Santa Claus in shops . "

The 9th Australian Division Versus the Africa Corps

The 9th Australian Division Versus the Africa Corps:
An Infantry Division Against Tanks--Tobruk, Libya, 1941
At the time, the Australians' epic stand at Tobruk had a major impact on the war because the Germans suffered a serious and unexpected reversal. The Tobruk garrison demonstrated that the hitherto successful German blitzkrieg tactics could be defeated by resolute men who displayed courage and had the tactical and technical ability to coordinate and maximize the capabilities of their weapons and equipment in the defense.

American people were overwhelmingly isolationist

PACIFIC STRATEGY
At the turn of the twentieth century, after the war with Spain, the United States for the first time in a hundred years found itself involved closely in the affairs of other nations. The American people were overwhelmingly isolationist and unwilling to pay the price of colonial empire. It is against this background that American strategy in the Pacific and plans for the defense of U.S. island outposts must be viewed; it explains many of the seeming inconsistencies between policies and plans.

Germany-1946

Recent economic events have been portrayed as new, as below shows nothing has changed.
CHAPTER XXIII - Winter - The Season of Despair
Occ-GY/ch23
From the first sight in the spring of unplowed fields, shutdown coal mines, and ruined cities, the winter to come had loomed ominously in the minds of those who would be responsible for administering the occupied country. In June, predicting a barren winter for Europe, the Potter-Hyndley Mission contemplated a possible need "to preserve order by shooting" [emphasis added] in Germany.

The murder in Java on 17th April of three Australian officers

The murder in Java on 17th April of three Australian officers

177 Brookes to Dunk_9~177
177 Brookes to Dunk Cablegram 33 BATAVIA, 8 April 1946, 11 a.m. TOP SECRET
http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/(LookupVolNoNumber)/9~177
At the plenary sitting of the Conference which took place at 4 p.m. on March 30th at the Ambassador's residence', Van Mook and Sjahrir agreed that the following points were accepted by both parties and would be implemented, subject to the agreement of the Hague. The points are:- (1) The Netherlands Government recognises that the Republic of Indonesia is the de facto authority for Java and Sumatra except for those territories at present occupied by Allied forces. (2) The Netherlands Government and the Republic of Indonesia agree to work together to establish a federal state which would include all parts of the Netherlands East Indies; this federal free state to be a partner in the Commonwealth comprising Netherlands, Surinam, Curacao and the federal free state of Indonesia. (3) Both parties agree to open discussion on the structure of the free state of Indonesia taking as a rough basis relationship between the republic of France and the republic of Vietnam. [2] If the Hague agree to these proposals, both the ultimate sovereignty of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia will be recognised and thus the face of both parties will be preserved. Sir Archibald Clark Kerr will not return to Java. I have graded this telegram 'Top Secret' as Van Mook did not propose to communicate the points until after his arrival in the Netherlands.
1 i.e. the U.K. sponsored Dutch-Indonesian discussions (see Documents 74 and 123), presumably held at the residence of Clark Kea. 2 See Document 123, note 1. [AA:A1838/2, 403/3/1/1, i]



196 Brookes to DEA_9~196-1946
196 Brookes to Department of External Affairs
Cablegram 35 BATAVIA, 18 April 1946, 9.50 a.m. MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET
http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/(LookupVolNoNumber)/9~196
During a closer investigation on 17th April of Japanese war crimes against Australian service personnel conducted near Buitenzorg, Squadron Leader Birchall, Officer in Charge, Australian War Crimes investigation is missing and Flight Lieut. McDonald also of War Crimes and Captain MacKenzie Australian Comforts Unit, murdered. One Australian civilian named Hanson [and a] British Army captain were wounded. As there are no other Australian officers here and because of political and publicity angle, I have taken charge of the matter. In this connection, I have approached Allied Headquarters on the highest level and everything possible is being done by them to locate Birchall. The bodies of MacKenzie and McDonald have been recovered and I am arranging for their burial with military honours at approximately 1700 hours on April 18th.I have also seen Sjahrir's representative in Batavia and the Senior Officer of the T.R.I. They have contacted the local Indonesian Government representative and T.R.I. commander in the area concerned. They have informed me that at approximately 2100 hours 17th April a search party was sent out. The political and publicity angle are and will have to be handled most carefully as it is not known absolutely for certain that Indonesians were responsible for the murders and secondly, if so, whether they were members of T.R.I. (the Republican Army) or simply a band of cut throats. I have signalled Lieut. Col. Smith, Officer in Charge of War Crimes Detachment, Major Quinton, Officer in Charge of Contact Unit and Massey in Singapore advising them regarding the position. British War Crimes Investigation Units have signalled military details to the above mentioned officers. [AA:A1838/2, 401/3/10/2, ii]
AWM-ww2roll
[Frederick George Birchall Rank Squadron Leader [Sqn Ldr] Service Number 252031
Unit RAAF Hq Melbourne Service RAAF Conflict 1939-1945 Date of Death 17 April 1946
Place of Death Java Cause of Death Ground Battle Source AWM148 Roll of Honour cards, 1939-1945 War, Air Force http://www.awm.gov.au/roh/person.asp?p=148-29469]
[Service Record Name Birchall, Frederick George - Service Royal Australian Air Force
Service Number 252031 - Date of Birth 10 Feb 1901 Place of Birth Unknown - Date of Enlistment Unknown - Locality on Enlistment Unknown - Place of Enlistment Unknown - Next of Kin Birchall, Harriet
Date of Death 17 Apr 1946 - Rank Squadron Leader - Posting on Death RAAFHQ (DPS-P6)
WW2 Honours and Gallantry None for display Prisoner of War No - Roll of Honour Unknown]
[http://www.cwgc.org/search/SearchResults.aspx?surname=Birchall&initials=&war=2&yearfrom=1946&yearto=1946&force=Air&nationality=&send.x=54&send.y=11
No 1 Surname Birchall, Frederick George Rank Squadron Leader Service Number 252031 Date Of Death 17/04/1946 Age 47Regiment/Service Royal Australian Air Force Nationality Australian Grave/Memorial Ref. 4. D. 5Cemetery/Memorial Name Jakarta War Cemetery]
[Alastair Norman MacKenzie Rank Captain [Capt] Service Number VX74 Unit 3 PW Contact & Enquiry Unit Service Army Conflict 1939-1945 Date of Death 17 April 1946 Place of Death Java Cause of Death Killed (on duty) Source AWM147 Roll of Honour cards, 1939-1945 War, 2nd AIF (Australian Imperial Force) and CMF (Citizen Military Force) http://www.awm.gov.au/roh/person.asp?p=147-14962]
[Service Record http://www.ww2roll.gov.au/script/veteran.asp?ServiceID=A&VeteranID=416700
Name MacKenzie, Alastair Norman - Service Australian Army - Service Number VX74
Date of Birth 23 Aug 1917 Place of Birth Mount Gambier, SA - Date of Enlistment 27 Oct 1939
Locality on Enlistment Melbourne, VIC - Place of Enlistment South Melbourne, VIC
Next of Kin MacKenzie, Charles - Date of Death 17 Apr 1946 - Rank Captain - Posting on Death Unknown - WW2 Honours and Gallantry None for display Prisoner of War No - Roll of Honour Unknown]
[Grave/Memorial Ref. 4. F. 3 Cemetery/Memorial Name Jakarta War Cemetery]
[Hector Murdoch McDonald Rank Flight Lieutenant [Flt Lt] Service Number 120571 Unit RAAF Hq (NW Area) Darwin Service RAAF Conflict 1939-1945 Date of Death 17 April 1946 Place of Death Java Cause of Death Ground Accident Source AWM148 Roll of Honour cards, 1939-1945 War, Air Force http://www.awm.gov.au/roh/person.asp?p=148-34887]
[Service Record Name McDonald, Hector Murdoch - Service Royal Australian Air Force
Service Number 120571 - Date of Birth 16 May 1902 Place of Birth Meeniyan, VIC - Date of Enlistment 9 Nov 1942 - Locality on Enlistment Unknown - Place of Enlistment Melbourne, VIC - Next of Kin McDonald, Rosamund - Date of Death 17 Apr 1946 - Rank Flight Lieutenant - Posting on Death RAAF HQ (DPS-P6) - WW2 Honours and Gallantry None for display Prisoner of War No - Roll of Honour Unknown]
[Grave/Memorial Ref. 4. F. 2 Cemetery/Memorial Name Jakarta War Cemetery]


204 Brookes to DEA_9~204
http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/(LookupVolNoNumber)/9~204
204 Brookes to Department of External Affairs
Cablegram 39 BATAVIA, [22 April 1946]IMMEDIATE SECRET
The following letter was handed to me this morning by the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of the [Indonesian] Republican Government.' To Mr. A. D. Brookes, Representative of Government of Australia.1. We beg you to convey to the Government of Australia the assurance that we deeply deplore the unhappy incident whereby Australian officers were wantonly killed and wounded. [see 196]
2. The first news of the accident have reached us, as you are aware, through your communication to Dr. Boediardjo, the representative of Dr. Sjahrir in Djakarta [2] and Major Moekiman of TRI, as our Government has no regular armed forces, either military or police, along the road from Bogor (Buitenzorg) to Sukabumi.3. We can assure you that all possible efforts are being endeavoured and will further be made to retrieve the missing Flight Commander Birchall and surrender him to you as well as to find the missing documents etc.4. All possible endeavours will also be made to learn who are the guilty persons and to find them and bring them to justice.5. In the meantime from part of our Army Command in West Java, who has undertaken to investigate into the matter. [3] All efforts are made to get all possible information concerned, which when and in how far obtained, we will not fail to communicate to you without delay.6. With reiterated assurance of our perfect consideration, we have the honour to be Sir, yours sincerely (Signed) Hadji Agoes Lutysta [Salim],Vice Minister' In view of the fact that paragraph two was a statement on a military matter I felt it desirable to inform Brigadier of the General AFNEI of the contents. He has made the following comment.' The statement that no regular military forces of the so called "Government" are along the road is not correct. A unit of TRI is in the area and recently took part in an attack on a convoy. Consider, however, more likely that the outrage committed by irregular forces. 'If you propose to release the letter and comments to the press I would be grateful if you would advise me so that I can arrange simultaneous release here. I have protested to the British Authorities that the advice regarding the deaths of McDonald and MacKenzie was given to Allied Forces then only 22 hours after the murders had occurred and with MacKenzie's rank given incorrectly. I trust that this was not released in Australia before relations were notified. In addition the Indonesians released an incorrect statement as to the murders and I have asked them to correct this. The Indonesians have now discovered the body of Birchall -and were taking it to Buitenzorg this afternoon. I have done everything possible to ensure that no publicity is given to this before forty-eight hours elapses so that relatives are notified. The present Indonesian [4] as to the culprit responsible is it was done by a Japanese deserter disguised as an Indonesian. This I believe to be complete nonsense, for all except Indonesians realize that it is the work of the Indonesians. It seems quite beyond the capacity of one Japanese to do it. This Indonesian [theory is not being released at this stage. Regarding the letter from Hadji Salim I have informed the press that I did receive a letter from the 'Republican Government' prior to notification of Birchall's death; that as requested I was telegraphing to the Commonwealth Government and that the former expressed deep regret for the deaths and gave an assurance that everything possible was being done to recover Birchall and to apprehend the culprit.] [5] 1 See Document 196. 2 i.e. Batavia.3 Presumably meant to read: 'In the meantime part of our Army Command in West Java, has undertaken to investigate the matter.'4 Sign here indicates 'mutilated'.5 The matter in square brackets was indecipherable and was repeated in cablegram 40 of 24 April, on the same file. On 25 April, Brookes was instructed not to take any action concerning the letter, and 'above all, not to acknowledge it ... formally or informally'. [AA:A1838/2, 401/3/10/2, ii]



209 Forde to Chifley and Evatt_9~209-1946
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209 Forde to Chifley and Evatt
Cablegram A19 CANBERRA, 25 April 1946 MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET
As distinct from the inquiries which Brookes is making into the murder of the three Australian officers in Java [see 196 and 204], it seems necessary that the Commonwealth Government should take immediate steps to record a strong protest and, notwithstanding the expressions of regret and the assurances contained in the letter to Brookes from the Indonesian Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to demand fullest investigation by the Indonesian authorities and active steps to bring the murderers to justice. The letter addressed to Brookes is not thought to be adequate, particularly the reference to the outrage as an unhappy incident. The initial difficulty is that formal protest cannot be presented to any Indonesian authority. We recognise the Netherlands as the sovereign power in the area and anything which could be regarded as an acknowledgment of an Indonesian Government might lead to complications which it seems desirable to avoid. This should not in our opinion delay or prevent the strongest protest directly or indirectly to the Indonesian Leaders. The Supreme Authority in Java at present is the British General who is Allied Military Commander. The course which we would propose is for Brookes to be instructed to request the Allied Military Commander to convey to the responsible Indonesian leaders, in whatever way he thinks most suitable and in the strongest possible terms, the extremely grave view which the Commonwealth Government takes of the murders and to call upon those Leaders to take all possible steps to bring the murderers to justice; also to inform them that the Commonwealth Government cannot accept the description in the Vice-Minister's letter of the wanton murders as an unhappy incident. Would appreciate early advice. 1 See Documents 196 and 204. [AA:A1838/2, 401/3/10/2, ii]
215 Evatt to Forde_9~215-1946
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215 Evatt to Forde Cablegram E13 London, 26 April 1946, 5.38 p.m. Immediate Secret
Your A.19. [Document 209] Course you propose seems correct one but feel facts must be ascertained. An investigation should take place at an early date and I suggest that Judge Kirby be sent immediately to Batavia for this purpose. If he so recommends, demand should be made for compensation as well as punishment. Kirby has had considerable experience of area. [AA:A1838/2, 401/3/10/2, ii]

220 DEA to Brookses_9~220
220 Department of External Affairs to Brookes
Cablegram 26 CANBERRA, 29 April 1946SECRET
http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/(LookupVolNoNumber)/9~220
Please request the Commanding Officer, Allied Forces, Java (1) to convey to responsible Indonesian leaders in whatever way he thinks most suitable, and in the strongest possible terms the extremely grave view which the Commonwealth Government takes of the murder of Australians [see 196] and to call upon Indonesian leaders to bring the murderers to justice; and(2) to inform them that the Commonwealth Government cannot accept the description in the Vice Minister's letter [see 204] of these wanton and abhorrent murders as an 'unhappy incident'.2. Your 41 paragraph 10. [3] Request the C.O. Allied Forces, to arrange for the most searching inquiry into these outrageous crimes, making full use of the services of Lieut Colonel Smith and the Australian War Crimes detachment.
1 See Document 196. 2 See Document 204. 3 In paragraph 10, Brookes advised that he had intended to arrange a full enquiry and requested advice. [AA:A1838/2, 401/3/10/2, ii]

240 Brookes to Dunk_9~240
240 Brookes to Dunk
Cablegram 76 BATAVIA, 11 May 1946,10.20 a.m. MOST IMMEDIATE TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL
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Further my telegram 73. [1] Your telegram 34. [2] 1. You will appreciate that the idea that the General Officer Commanding expressed in paragraph 4 of my telegram 73 was tentative only and given prior to consultation with his advisers. 2. Since then I have seen the General Officer Commanding and his principal political adviser, MacKereth, and both agree that the Japanese responsible for the murders should be handed over to the Allied authorities for trial as war criminals. 3. I saw Sjahrir last night in company with the Senior A.F.N.E.I. Liaison Officer and he has promised to issue instructions that the Japanese concerned shall be delivered to A.F.N.E.I. 4. After preliminary interrogations, A.F.N.E.I. propose to fly the Japanese to Singapore for expert interrogation and trial. The only legal authority for trying offences against members of the central administration is in a laborious Dutch court in Batavia. 5. As some Indonesians are also implicated in the crime, and as their extradition from the interior would place Sjahrir, who has shown the utmost goodwill, in an impossible political situation, and most likely involve A.F.N.E.I. in large scale military operations, it was not considered desirable to press Sjahrir to hand over the Indonesians. Further the handing over of the Indonesians, who in any case appear to have played a minor part, would almost certainly result in both the Indonesians and Japanese being shot before interrogation. There would be no possible grounds for trying to send the Indonesians, being Dutch subjects, to Singapore as well as the Japanese. Sjahrir has given me his assurance that the Indonesians will be tried and if found guilty the fullest penalty will be exacted. He has invited an A.F.N.E.I. representative to attend who will be able to conduct an interrogation and unofficially attend the trial and execution.6. The only other alternative is that the Indonesian authorities will try, and doubtless execute, both Japanese and Indonesians in the presence of a British Officer who can only attend unofficially, as to attend officially would involve the British authorities in de jure recognition of an Indonesian court. Sjahrir has stated that he was willing to try the Japanese also if desired.7. A third Japanese whom Sjahrir believes to be implicated in the crime is still at large. Sjahrir has given instructions for his capture.8. Documents belonging to MacDonald were handed to me yesterday and I have passed them to Lieutenant-Colonel Smith. It is not known whether the documents are complete. It is certain however, that MacDonald's diary has been, tampered with and this is being investigated most thoroughly.9. The court of enquiry has been completed and I will advise of findings when promulgated.10. In the circumstances details of agreement with the Japanese asked for by you in paragraph 2 of your telegram 34 appear irrelevant.11. The whole of this signal should be read in the light of the peculiar and extremely tense relations between Dutch and Indonesians at present. Bearing this in mind the course outlined in paragraphs 1 to 5 above after full consultation with MacKereth and G.O.C. appears to be the only practical one. As it is, the Dutch might well be expected to protest against the sending of the Japanese to Singapore and the trial of Indonesians by Indonesians. Already they are evincing considerable interest in the matter.12. I have informed Mr. MacKereth of the contents of this signal and he is signalling to the Foreign Office in much the same terms. He will also express to them his strong convictions that action as disclosed in paragraphs 1 to 5 above is the only practical course which would be compatible with a thorough investigation and one which did not depend on findings of an Indonesian court however well disposed. Sjahrir stated that he was willing for Indonesian witnesses to be flown to Singapore, other than those implicated in the murder.13. Smith is signalling Headquarters A.M.F. and asking them, (1) whether they consider the Japanese can be charged as war criminals. (2) if so, then is it desired that the Australian war crimes court at Singapore should try them. The legal points at issue are I am informed, whether the murders can be regarded as a war crime as distinct from a post war crime and whether the power of a war crimes court could cover the case. A copy of Army's reply will be given to me. Smith is proceeding to Singapore tomorrow. 14. It was through my intervention that Japanese and Indonesians responsible have not already been tried and executed by the Indonesian authorities.15. Please send instructions urgently. [3]
1 Dispatched 6 May, it reported that two Japanese and three Indonesians had been apprehended by the Indonesian authorities in connection with the murder of three Australian service personnel (see Document 196); Mansergh considered that, in accordance with a previous agreement, 'the Japanese would be tried by the Japanese', and that the Indonesian authorities should try the Indonesians.
2 Dispatched 8 May in reply to cablegram 73, it conveyed the External Affairs Dept's surprise at the suggestion that the Japanese should be tried by a Japanese tribunal.3 The External Affairs Dept replied on 13 May that Brookes should not give consent to the proposed procedures until after Evatt (in London) had been consulted. [AA:A1838/2, 401/3/10/2, ii]
241 Brookes to DEA_9~241

241 Brookes to Department of External Affairs
Cablegram 79 BATAVIA, 12 May 1946IMMEDIATE SECRET
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Your telegram 46 [1] and my telegram 60 giving text of G.O.C. letter to Sjahrir. Below is Sjahrir's reply which was handed to Mansergh this morning. Begins. To Lieutenant General E. C. Mansergh, C.B.E., M.C. Headquarters AFNEI. In reply to your letter of May 1st, I beg you to convey to the Australian Government the repeated assurance, that the Government of the Indonesian Republic deeply deplores the fate befallen members of the Australian war crimes investigation party. [2] My Government is of the opinion that there has been committed a crime of the most detestable sort. I want to make it quite clear to you that in my opinion the affair is a matter of honour of the Indonesian Nation towards a great nation which cherishes most sympathetic feelings towards Indonesia and their pronounced and democratic aspirations for freedom. On account of this, I have personally ordered to be set up a special committee of investigation with explicit orders to make vigorous efforts in investigating the circumstances of the murder. I ordered that it must not fail to keep me daily informed of any progress made in this respect. At the present moment we are fortunate to be able to inform you of recent results of energetic enquiries related to this matter i.e. that two Japanese operating under false Indonesian names have been arrested; they have been in touch with three Indonesians connected with the case; from possession of the arrested persons the lost documents and a photographic apparatus have been recovered. My Government has already issued a statement with regard to the results mentioned above. We are endeavouring to do the utmost to have enquiries completed as far as possible in order that the criminals can be brought to justice without delay. In the light of the seriousness in which we viewed the matter from the outset, [we] deem it the more deplorable that a less appropriate term in the Vice Minister's letter [3] has caused dissatisfaction to arise on the part of the Government. [4] Therefore I can be only grateful if our strenuous efforts can be accepted as proof of the seriousness with which my Government have been dealing with the case from the very start. May these efforts be conducive to eliminate the wrong impressions which a less appropriate term has caused to arise. I should be very grateful if you will be kind enough to send a copy of this letter to the Australian Commonwealth Government. Yours sincerely,(Signed) W. S. Sjahrir, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Ends. Regarding paragraph 5 of Sjahrir's letter, I have already sent you the text of the statement in my telegram 75. In my telegram 75 I said that I would advise you further regarding the last sentences of Indonesian communique, this is covered in my telegram 76. [5]The G.O.C. has passed a copy of Sjahrir's letter, set out above to me, and is replying to Sjahrir to the effect that he has forwarded a copy to me and doubtless, I will inform the Commonwealth Government. Without specific instructions from you I shall not acknowledge the letter officially, but if questioned by Indonesians before receiving instructions from you I propose to inform them that I have signalled the letter to the Commonwealth Government. 1 Presumably cablegram, 26 (Document 220).2 See Document 196.3 See Document 204.
4 See Document 209. 5 Document 240. [AA:A838/2, 401/3/10/2, ii]


242 Aus Gov to Mountbatten_9~242
242 Australian Government to Mountbatten
Cablegram 10 CANBERRA, 13 May 1946 MOST IMMEDIATE TOP SECRET
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The murder in Java on 17th April of three Australian officers Squadron Leader F. G. Birchall, Captain A. N. MacKenzie, [and] Flight Lieutenant H. M. McDonald [1] has occasioned great concern to the Australian Government. While we fully appreciate the action taken by AFNEI to investigate the murders and to institute a Court of Inquiry and also the co-operation afforded the Australian Political Representative in Batavia by the Forces under your Command, we feel that it is desirable that an Australian judge should thoroughly investigate the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes and report back to the Australian Government. The procedures appropriate to the trial of persons implicated in the murders may also require careful consideration. 2. Accordingly we are seeking to obtain the services of judge R. C. Kirby of New South Wales and, if you are agreeable to attach him to your Command, we expect to be able to arrange for him to proceed to Java towards the end of May. 3. You will recall judge Kirby was previously attached to your Command in connection with War Crimes investigation. 1 See Document 196. [AA:A1838/2, 401/3/10/2, ii]

260 Forde to Mountbatten_9~260
260 Forde to Mountbatten
Cablegram 11 CANBERRA, 21 May 1946 SECRET MOST IMMEDIATE
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Australian Government much appreciates your concurrence in attachment to your Command of Judge Kirby in connection with investigation of circumstances surrounding murder of three Australians in Java. [1] In accordance with your suggestion, action has been taken through Australian Representative, Batavia, to make necessary arrangements direct with British Authorities in Batavia. 2. Judge Kirby expects to be able to complete special enquiry which he has been conducting in Tasmania in time to leave for Singapore on 28th May. He would appreciate personal discussion with you before proceeding to Batavia. 3. As you are aware Australian Government is greatly concerned to ensure that perpetrators of crime are brought to justice and that most appropriate procedures are adopted for their trial. We have received a number of reports from our representative in Batavia as to procedures which may be adopted including suggestions- (a) that Indonesians may try both Japanese and Indonesians accused and (b) that Japanese may be handed over for trial by British Authorities and that Indonesians accused will be tried by Indonesian Court. [2] 4. For various reasons neither of these proposals seems entirely satisfactory and we very much hope that decision as to procedure to be adopted can be delayed until arrival of Judge Kirby and discussed with him. 5. In the meantime Government feels it is highly desirable that accused should be handed over to British custody. While it is realised that this may not be easy to arrange, Government would be grateful if you could take steps to ensure that everything possible is done to this end. 6. We feel that unless accused are in British custody there can be no assurance that full and impartial investigation will take place. On the other hand, if transfer to British custody can be arranged, slight delay pending arrival of Judge Kirby for consultation would not be significant. 7. I am sure you will find that when Judge Kirby arrives he will give every possible assistance. At the same time the presence of an Australian judge on the spot who can report back to the Government regarding procedures ultimately decided upon and surrounding circumstances would be of special value to the Australian Government. 8. Please pass copy to Australian Commissioner, Singapore.' 1 See Document 242. 2 See Document 240. 3 Brookes reported on the same day that he had been advised by the Indonesian authorities that the Japanese suspects had committed suicide. [AA:A4355/2, 5/1]
262 Brookes to Dunk_9~262
262 Brookes to Dunk Cablegram 93 BATAVIA, 21 May 1946 TOP SECRET
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Van Mook gave Sjahrir the Dutch modified proposals which are described as a protocol. 2. Van Mook has not informed any of the British authorities what is contained in the protocol. He gave rather a frank, off the record, talk to the press beforehand about this. Jenkins of the Argus is keeping me fully informed about such matters. For example at the press conference Van Mook said that he would propose to Sjahrir that a joint Dutch-Indonesian operation should be conducted to re-establish law and order in Sumatra. 3. A British officer saw Sjahrir after the meeting and was shown the protocol. The protocol was revised in medieval Dutch legalistic language. There are very few supported statements in the modified form and much talk about the holding of an Imperial Conference at a date unspecified, the purpose of this Conference being to discuss with the de facto Government of Java and representatives (nominated by the Dutch) of outer island possessions framework of the contemplated set up of the Netherlands Empire. The British officer had to read the document in a hurry and found it very vague. Sjahrir's comment was that the protocol offered the Indonesians 40% less than agreed upon at the negotiations under Inverchapel's direction. [1] He said that the wording of the protocol would make it very difficult for him although he desired agreement, and stressed how often the phrase 'Holland's historical ties with the Indonesians' featured in it. The use of the word 'tie' in the present circumstances he said is unfortunate. Further, exclusion of mention of the President of the Republic made his own position more difficult. 4. Sjahrir left for the interior this morning and is not sure whether he will return or if he returns whether he will remain long. He has promised to inform the British beforehand what he proposes to do. 5. The Indonesians believe one of the first steps of an independent British Indian Government will be the recognition of their Republic. All believe that Pandit Nehru will be appointed Foreign Secretary. 6. In the light of the above, I respectfully suggest that the Australian Government might consider very seriously what the Government of India's attitude to the problem of the Indonesians is going to be and, therefore, might weigh up the pros and cons of taking constructive action first. I refer you to paragraph 3 of my telegram 94 [2] and to the inconclusive results of the Dutch elections.
1 See Document 177. 2 In paragraph 3, Brookes reported that every forward thrust into the interior by the British and Dutch authorities weakened Sjahrir's position there, and that, if his position in Java, continued to be weakened, the hope of 'any moderate and stable Government deteriorates in proportion'. [AA:A1838/2, 403/3/1/1, i]



273 Dunk to Evatt_9~273
273 Dunk to Evatt
Cablegram 71 CANBERRA, 28 May 1946 TOP SECRET IMMEDIATE PERSONAL
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Although I have carried out your instructions to leave Brookes in Batavia for the time being, I feel bound to advise that I am greatly disturbed at Brookes' recent cables and fear that unless he is given a period of rest in Australia, or at least, placed under some more senior Officer, he may unconsciously involve Australia in matters of serious consequence. 2. From his cables I would judge that he is a sincere young man of limited experience, not in the best of health (he has had a number of bouts of fever). He has a marked sympathy for the Indonesian cause in general and Sjahrir in particular which apparently makes it difficult for him to maintain a proper balance and judgment. His telegrams contain frequent references to 'rumours' and 'suspicions', which are frequently unsupported by any facts. For example, in a recent telegram [1] he stated 'There have been suspicions that, apart from Spoor, Mrs. van Mook might be linked in the matter. The suspicion, which is scarcely more than a rumour, is that she was connected with the Dutch Nazi Party'. Brookes has undoubtedly close contacts with Sjahrir who gives him much information, but it does not appear to have crossed his mind that Sjahrir may be using him for his own purposes. 3. Brookes' telegrams often refer to questions of highest policy. He has not hesitated, for instance, to reply personally to a question by Sjahrir as to the probable reaction of the outside world if Sjahrir resigned as Premier (see paragraph (f) of Brookes' 102 repeated to you in my immediately preceding telegram). The situation has developed to such a stage that Sjahrir and Brookes are discussing together the possibility of the Indonesian Cabinet appealing to the United Nations through Australia, and it is quite conceivable that such a request may come in the near future. 4. Judge Kirby will shortly be in the area and his presence will be useful in dealing with the murder of the three Australians. [2] Kirby is not, however, a departmental officer and can scarcely be expected to carry out the multifarious duties which would fall to such an officer. In all the circumstances I strongly recommend that Brookes should be returned to Australia for rest and consultation as soon as possible after Kirby arrives, and that in the meantime arrangements should be made for another officer of the department to go to Batavia. We could possibly send Moodie from Calcutta if you have no one particularly in mind. 1 Cablegram 90, dispatched 24 May. 2 See Document 260. [AA:A3196, 1946, 0.10653]

279 Evatt to Dunk_9~279
279 Evatt to Dunk
Cablegram 678 WASHINGTON, 29 May 1946 TOP SECRET PERSONAL
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Your UNY70 [1] and UNY71. [2] I must say I do not feel much sympathy with the telegram UNY71. I think that Brookes should remain with Kirby during latter's assignment. I understand that Brookes was appointed on your own decision. He was certainly a stranger to me but I was impressed with his integrity and ability. Burton is more conversant with the situation than I, and it would be unwise to deprive Kirby of Brookes' experience. In circumstance I would postpone any action ... If Brookes exceeds ordinary functions it must be remembered that situation is unique one and I must say I do not like continual interference with man on the spot who is loyally serving Australia's interests. Please show this telegram to Burton and the Minister. Kind regards. 1 Dispatched 28 May, it conveyed the text of cablegram 102 from Brookes reporting his conversation with Sjahrir (see Document 273, paragraph 3). 2 Document 273. [SFU:EVATT COLLECTION, EXTERNAL AFFAIRS-ORIGINAL FILE(a)]
291 Sjahrir to Brookes_9~291
291 Sjahrir to Brookes
Letter DJAKARTA, 5 June 1946
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I am so sorry that you are leaving us. I hope that there is still a chance that you will come back after having taken some rest. At the cabinet meeting in the interior we discussed the latest Dutch proposals [1] and we agreed to put forward counterproposals embodying the same standpoint we had during the negotiations with the Dutch in Djakarta [2], when Sir Archibald Clark Kerr was here and also during the talks in Holland with the Dutch cabinet. We all think it most unlikely that the Dutch will accept these counterproposals and that fighting may break out at any time. As you know sporadic fighting continues everywhere in the surroundings of the allied occupied areas. Last week I lost a relation of mine in the Tangerang area. In view of the possibility of a definite breakdown of the negotiations and of the outbreak of a large scale fighting, we discussed at the cabinet meeting possible ways to avoid this bloodshed. I proposed to approach the Australian Government and to ask whether Australia would be prepared to raise our question before the UNO on the terms of the draft agreement made under the chairmanship of Sir Archibald Clark Kerr. You know what they are. This proposal of mine was unanimously accepted by the cabinet. We also agreed that the matter could be raised in the UNO irrespective of the Dutch reactions to our counterproposals, because there is an apparent tendency that the Dutch would again drag on, while the danger of more and violent fighting is increasing every day. Could you do something for us on these lines? We would be very grateful. I hope you will have a good journey and that we will see you back soon. [3] Good bye. W. S. SJAHRIR
1 See Document 262. 2 See Document 177. 3 Brookes was in poor health and was advised by medical authorities that he 'should do no further work in [the] tropics'. He arrived in Canberra on 10 June. [AA:A1838/2, 403/3/1/1, i]


297 Brookes to DEA_9~297

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297 Brookes to Department of External Affairs
Cablegram 112 BATAVIA, 8 June 1946 TOP SECRET MOST IMMEDIATE
Further to my telegram 102. [1] Sjahrir has returned from Central Java with the bulk of his Cabinet. I went to say goodbye to Sjahrir and he asked me to convey the request set out below to the Australian Government. 2. Whilst in the interior Dr. Sjahrir and the Indonesian Cabinet discussed the question of U.N.O. action to resolve the future of Indonesia. The Cabinet unanimously authorised Sjahrir to approach the Australian Government and to ask whether Australia would be prepared to raise the matter of Self Government of Indonesia especially in reference to Java and Sumatra with U.N.O. [2] The Indonesian Cabinet believes that the present situation in Indonesia is a threat to world peace and could be legally raised in U.N.O. on those grounds. The Indonesian counter proposals [3] are on the lines of the draft agreement made under the Chairmanship of Clark Kerr [4] but they believe it is most unlikely that the Dutch will accept these and that fighting may break out at any time. Sporadic fighting on the perimeter continues. The Indonesian Cabinet request that the matter be raised irrespective of the Dutch reactions to their counter proposals. Sjahrir gave me a personal letter [5] to this effect and which I am bringing to Australia with me. 3. Sjahrir also said:- (a) That the situation in Sumatra was well in hand from the viewpoint of the Indonesian Government and that representatives here were obeying orders from the Government in Java; (b) The T.R.I. in Java were more and more under control but there was still much to be done in this regard; (c) That if U.N.O. and negotiations with the Dutch failed the Indonesians proposed to fight a defensive war; (d) The reformation of Cabinet is of no real significance; (e) Soewandi [6] has definitely resigned and will probably accept a position as Secretary of one of the Indonesian Government Departments. 4. I have informed MacKereth regarding the above. 1 See Document 279, note 1. 2 See Document 291. 3 These were: conclusion of a treaty according de facto recognition to the government of the Indonesian republic; a Netherlands guarantee of co-operation in the establishment of an Indonesian free sure which would enter into an alliance with the Netherlands; cessation of hostilities, with both sides 4 See Document 177. 5 Document 291 6 R. Soewandi, Republican Minister for Justice. [AA:A1838/2, 403/3/1/1, i]

299 Kirby to Evatt and Dunk_9~299
299 Kirby to Evatt and Dunk
Cablegram 114 BATAVIA, 9 June 1946TOP SECRET MOST IMMEDIATE
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PART I Reference telegram 112 [1] from Brookes and letter referred to in that telegram. [2] Sjahrir is proceeding with preparation of counter proposals [3] according to draft set out in Brookes' telegram 113, but has not yet presented them. On reading Brookes' telegram 112 and the letter referred to therein I think Sjahrir rather clumsily expressed his intention which was not to make a formal request to Australia for intervention by UNO at that stage but to indicate that when his counter proposals are turned down by the Dutch as he is certain they will be he will then make a formal request to Australia to the effect indicated. In this way Sjahrir believed Australian Government could be prepared for the request in advance and that if thought advisable the Government could unofficially indicate its attitude to me to such a request and if and how the Government would like it made. As I happen to be an Australian on the spot with no official representative position Sjahrir will probably ask me to return to Australia with a request which could be received if desired without public announcement until such time as Government desired. Would appreciate urgent advice in anticipation of request by Sjahrir for me to act as indicated. Since writing the above I have learned that whilst Soekarno has definitely agreed with Sjahrir and cabinet to the request for Australian intervention through UNO he had previously made unofficial approaches to Nationalist leaders in India to raise the issue on their behalf with the Government of India. As long as Indian troops and journalists are here Soekarno will continue to have unofficial contact with Nationalist leaders in India and I should think would not hesitate to make similar appeal to India should other alternatives fail. PART II Further my 111.1. After seeing Sjahrir I have been consulted by his departmental legal officers who suggested trial [4] by Indonesian Court with Australian observer but I flatly refused to discuss this. Interview however was extremely amicable and I feel certain that at any time now Sjahrir will carry out suggestions set out in paragraph 2 of III [5]2. Subject your approval I have always envisaged trial by military court set up by AFNEI in Batavia. In fact mentioned this to Mountbatten before his departure but I did not make a feature of this as I thought AFNEI would in that way deal itself with all offences of a military nature as occupying force. He indicated general approval of my plans but said I was to ask Mansergh to carry out my requirements first and only invoke SAC authority if Mansergh considered he could not act without it.3. Since my arrival in Batavia I have been informed that all offences by non-military personnel whether of a military nature or not are tried by Civil Affairs Courts and that this has been ordered by War Office. The fact is that these courts are exclusively conducted by Dutch Law Officers.4. Because of information set out in paragraph 3 I feel it should be assured before the suspects are handed over to AFNEI that AFNEI will set up military court and not (repeat not) hand them over to a court conducted by Dutch officials which would not, I take it, be countenanced by Australia.5. At first I intended to get prior undertaking by Mansergh-(1) to retain custody of suspects by AFNEI once custody was obtained;(2) to set up military court to try them;(3) not (repeat not) to put a Dutch member on the Court.6. In spite of unofficial endeavours to get some advance idea of Mansergh's probable attitude to a request by me as set out in paragraph 5 I have no real anticipation of his attitude.7. Therefore as at present informed I feel it might be a big risk to have the suspects handed over to AFNEI without being sure of the three matters set out in paragraph 5.8. As the War Office evidently involved by having given some instruction to the effect set out in paragraph 3 I thought I should ask you for instructions as to whether to approach Mansergh first and if refused SAC or whether it would be better for you to raise the matter with the Government of the United Kingdom so that the matter could be dealt with on a higher level. In case of a change of circumstances here it might be advisable to let me know of your intention to take latter course before acting.9. My hesitation in approaching Mansergh is that the Dutch may hear of the matter and complicate the whole position by making a request that they as the de jure sovereign power exercise the right to try the suspects or by making a demand for the trial to be by the usual Civil Affairs Court especially if there has been some agreement that such Courts should try all offences by non-military personnel. I do not think it wise to place too much reliance on Van Mook's statement referred in paragraph 1 of my telegram III. [6]10. Although I have not yet succeeded in obtaining the evidence against the suspects possessed by the Indonesians their departmental officers informed me and I believe that there is no doubt of proof of their guilt and that confessions have been made by each of them.11. Because of the general situation the question of trial may not be considered as immediately important as formerly by the Minister and a false step in regard to it might seriously prejudice more important matters. I think it important also to remember that if the information in paragraph 10 is correct investigation into background suspicions may be more important than the trial of the actual perpetrators.12. In view of the delicate situation you may prefer me to return and have the benefit of discussion and advice before taking any definite step and even if Sjahrir offers to hand over suspects to AFNEI I will await instructions before I let him announce such offer or implement it. I expect this offer by Sjahrir to be made at any time now.13. If I were required by you to return with the request by Sjahrir mentioned in part I the other matters could be held in status quo pending conference and instructions.14. The above has been written to keep you fully posted and to give you the opportunity to give me special instructions if you desire but if you think it advisable I am fully prepared to handle this matter of custody and trial here myself.15. Could I please have urgent instructions. [7]16. I feel I should add that Brookes has very good standing here with Sjahrir and MacKereth and that in my lay opinion he has handled a difficult situation very well.
1 Document 297.2 Document 291.3 See Document 297, note 3.4 See Document 260.5 That it would be to Indonesia's 'advantage generally and particularly in regard to continued Australian sympathy if [Sjahrir] voluntarily and immediately handed over suspects and available evidence and information' to AFNEI.6 Van Mook had supposed that the trial would be by a military court set up by AFNEI.7 On 12 June, the External Affairs Dept replied that it preferred Kirby not to make a special trip to Australia and that he should do nothing definite regarding the trial procedure until Evatt had been consulted. Three days later, in cablegram 55, Kirby was informed of Evatt's view that 'the Indonesian Government should not be encouraged to think that Australia will initiate its case before the United Nations'. Instead, Kirby was to 'direct all his efforts' to ensuring that those found guilty of murdering the Australian servicemen were tried as early as possible.
[AA:A4355/2, 5/1]

304 DEA to Evatt_9~304

304 Department of External Affairs to Evatt
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CANBERRA, 12 June 146, 8.30 a.m. Cablegram A39 TOP SECRET PERSONAL Batavia. Reference our telegram A36. [1]1. Brookes has arrived in Canberra where he will stay few days before going on recuperative leave. He brought with him personal letter from Sjahrir and Sjahrir's draft counter proposals which have been repeated to you in our telegrams Nos. A37 and A38.2. Sjahrir's letter read in light of Kirby's comments in paragraph one of his telegram 114 make it appear that Indonesian Government is making informal sounding as to readiness of Australian Government, if negotiations between Dutch and Indonesians fail, to take initiative in raising Indonesian question in Security Council. In considering what action should be taken in this connection it is pointed out that conversations with Brookes make it clear that United Kingdom Government, through MacKereth, is already aware of substance of Sjahrir's letter and that leakages in Batavia have resulted in Dutch becoming aware of suspicions that they (Dutch) may possibly be implicated in some way in murder of the three Australians. It is suggested that following action be taken re Sjahrir's letter.(a) That Brookes be authorized request Kirby give to Sjahrir verbal personal message stating that Brookes has discussed informally in Canberra matter raised by Sjahrir. Brookes has found in Canberra much sympathy for aspirations of Indonesians towards self-government and strong hopes that peaceful settlement between Dutch and Indonesians can be brought about at earliest possible moment. It is not felt that present time is appropriate for approach by Australia to Security Council both because difficult unsolved problems are already before Council and also because negotiations between Dutch and Indonesians are still in train. Australia, however, is deeply interested in progress of these negotiations and will do everything possible to help to bring them to successful conclusion.(b) That United Kingdom Government be informed officially of Sjahrir's letter and of substance of Brookes' reply. In addition United Kingdom Government might be urged to take every opportunity of making it clear to Dutch that they should do their utmost to reach agreed solution with Indonesians at same time they might point out lamentable consequences which may arise if negotiations fail, and refer to probability that matter will by one means or another be brought before Security Council should negotiations break down.3. As regards murders of the three Australians [2], it is suggested that trial by Military Court is only satisfactory solution. If Kirby assents to trial by Indonesian Court this may amount to tacit recognition of Sjahrir Government. On other hand trial by Dutch Court would be most unsatisfactory in view of doubts which have been raised as to Dutch complicity. Moreover it is assumed that Sjahrir is most unlikely to hand over accused for trial by Dutch.4. In view of contents of Kirby's 117 [3] it may be difficult to secure trial by Military Court. It is suggested however, that telegram might be sent to United Kingdom Government asking that effort be made to secure Dutch assent to this course. it could be pointed out to Dutch that alternative to trial by Military Court is likely to be trial by Indonesian Court with or without Australian assent and it could be argued that Dutch interests would be better served by their agreeing to trial by Military Court. Precedent of trial by Military Courts in Sourabaya could be invoked.5. As regards Kirby's suggestion that he should return quickly to Australia to give full background information we have informed him that we are in touch with you and would prefer him to remain in Batavia pending receipt your views. In meantime, we have arranged for Detective MacDermott to leave for Batavia on 16 June and hope to arrange for typist and assistant, for whom Kirby also asked, to leave Australia shortly. After discussions in Sydney, Burton advises that he has arranged for Brennan [4] to act as Kirby's assistant. This still leaves open, however, question of permanent representation in Batavia regarding which separate cable will be sent.
1 Dispatched 12 June to Evatt, it reported that subsequent cablegrams would contain Sjahfir's letter to Brookes (Document 291), the draft of Sjahrir's counter proposals (see Document 297, note 3), and Kirby's cablegrams 114 (Document 299), 116 and 117 of 11 June.2 See Document 242.3 In cablegram 117 of 11 June, Kirby reported that, while a special agreement between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands gave the Supreme Commander of SEAC power to set up military courts in Sourabaya, there was no such agreement in respect to Java. 4 J. M. Brennan.
[Sfu: Evatt Collection, External Affairs-Original File (A)]

311 AustGovt to Addison 9~311
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311 Australian Government to Addison
Cablegram 243 Canberra, 14 June 1946
Immediate

I. As you are no doubt aware, on 17th April 1946 three Australian officers attached to Australian War Crimes Section of S.E.A.C. were murdered in Java. [1] Commonwealth Government through General Mansergh made strong protest to Sjahrir. Indonesians subsequently arrested two Japanese and three Indonesians in connection with the crime, but we were later advised that the two Japanese had 'committed suicide'. [2] On 13th May, SACSEA was requested [3] to attach to his Command judge R. C. Kirby of N.S.W. District Court, as Commonwealth Government felt it was desirable that an Australian judge should thoroughly investigate the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime and report back to the Australian Government. SACSEA was also advised that Commonwealth Government thought that the procedures appropriate to the trial of the persons accused of the murders might require careful consideration and discussion with Judge Kirby before any decision was reached.
2. On 15th May, Australian Commissioner, Singapore, advised that SACSEA agreed with proposal regarding Kirby but requested matter should be taken up direct with appropriate British Military authorities in Batavia. Australian Political Representative Batavia was thereupon requested to arrange for attachment of Kirby to A.F.N.E.I. and to ask for the good offices of A.F.N.E.I. in ensuring that the accused should not be tried until Judge Kirby had discussed developments and possible procedures with A.F.N.E.I. and, if necessary, with SACSEA.
3. Judge Kirby arrived in Singapore on 29th May and proceeded to Batavia where he had discussions with A.F.N.E.I., Van Mook and Sjahrir. Before leaving Australia it was Kirby's preliminary view that desirable procedure would be to ensure that accused were handed over to A.F.N.E.I. by Indonesians for trial by an A.F.N.E.I. military court consisting of British Officers. Discussions in Batavia have confirmed judge Kirby in this view, in which we concur. For adoption of this procedure, however, two conditions must be satisfied, viz.-
(a) consent by Sjahrir to hand over accused for trial by a non-Indonesian Court, and
(b) Dutch concurrence in trial by military Court constituted as above, rather than by a Dutch Civil Affairs Court. As regards (a), there appears to be some possibility that Sjahrir may be induced to hand over accused, provided they are not to be tried by a Dutch Civil Affairs Court or by a Military Court containing Dutch officers. As regards (b), Kirby advises that there appears to be an agreement between United Kingdom and Netherlands that Military Courts for trial of non-military personnel can not be set up in Java, although under some special arrangement Netherlands and United Kingdom apparently agreed that Supreme Commander should have power to set up such Military Courts in Sourabaya. [4]
4. Trial by Indonesian or Dutch Courts of persons accused of murder of Australians would not in existing circumstances be acceptable to Australian opinion. It is desired therefore that every possible step should be taken to secure trial by Military Court composed of British Officers, and Commonwealth Government would greatly appreciate action by United Kingdom Government to secure Dutch assent to this course. In addition to Sourabaya precedent, it might be pointed out to the Dutch that failure to agree would undoubtedly cause Indonesians to refuse to hand over accused. This would lead either to trial by Indonesians themselves, or no trial at all-both of which alternatives would be unacceptable to Australia. In view of Dutch requests for retention of United Kingdom military forces in Java, it is felt that approach along above lines to Netherlands by United Kingdom would be successful.
5. Since matters involved are regarded as urgent and important, early advice would be appreciated. In meantime, Judge Kirby is being asked to withhold any formal request regarding trial procedure. [5]

1 Document 242.
2 See Document 260, note 3.
3 Document 242.
4 See Document 304, note 3.
5 The Dominions Office replied on 13 August that under paragraph 6 of the Civil Affairs Agreement of 24 August 1945 between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, civilians in the Netherlands East Indies alleged to have committed offences against persons or property or security of Allied forces could be tried before a military court. Therefore, SACSEA was being instructed to set up a British Military Court (in consultation with Kirby) when the accused were handed over to the British military authorities for trial.
[AA:A1838/2, 401/3/10/2, iii]


300 DEA to Hood_9~330
330 Department of External Affairs to Hood
Cablegram 418 CANBERRA, 26 June 1946 TOP SECRET
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INDONESIA Reference para 1 of your 4370 [1] To avoid possible misunderstanding, we wish to make it clear that letter given by Sjahrir to Brookes [2] was addressed to Brookes personally and did not contain specific request to Australian Government to raise Indonesian question in United Nations. it stated that Indonesian Cabinet had unanimously agreed to proposal by Sjahrir that Australian Government could be approached and asked whether Brookes could do something along those lines. Kirby subsequently advised that he understood Sjahrir intended to indicate he might make a formal request to Australia if and when his counter proposals were turned down by the Dutch. [3] 2. For your information, Copland advises that Vice Foreign Minister, Liu, referred to deaths of Chinese in Indonesia, suggested political settlement in Indonesia should be expedited, and enquired whether Australia would be interested in participating in any such move. He also hinted at mediation or reference of problem to Security Council. Copland made no comment. 3. Early advice would be appreciated regarding present position in connection with our telegram 243 of 14th June to Dominions Office [4] concerning trial of Indonesians accused of murdering Australians. 4. Please send Officer copy of your 437 and this telegram.
1 Dispatched 21 June. Hood reported in paragraph 1 that the Foreign Office had only 'general knowledge' of Sjahrir's suggestion that Australia be asked to raise the matter of self-government for Indonesia with the United Nations, and that it was certain Bevin would be strongly against such action. 2 Document 291. 3 See Document 299. 4 Document 311. [AA:A1838/2, 403/3/1/1, i]




9 Kirby to Evatt and Dunk_10~9
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9 Kirby to Evatt and Dunk
Cablegram 147 [BATAVIA], 4 July 1946 TOP SECRET IMMEDIATE
Reference murder investigation. [1] 1. From investigations made so far I have been able to ascertain the names of three Indonesians directly, and one indirectly, involved. Sjahrir and his officers have been doing their best to locate these men, but in disorganized state TRI [2] and Interior have not yet been able to do so. 2. It appears from my investigations so far that the two Japanese also involved did (repeat did) commit suicide, and I do not (repeat not) consider this was arranged or instigated. 3. On Sjahrir's return from kidnapping [3] I paid him a visit to offer felicitations on his escape, and he was so obviously anxious for Australian goodwill that I am convinced he has been sincere in his efforts to find and hand over culprits, and also that he will continue to do so. 4. I could not convey accurately to anybody not in this country how difficult it is to put one's hands on any particular Indonesians in the interior. My personal opinion is that one TRI officer concerned will be located soon, but he was not an actual perpetrator. The other men were never under arrest in our sense of the term, and I think they will take some running down. If I could get into the interior with a couple of TRI officers I feel sure I could get some order into their search, but here in Batavia we cannot do much in that regard, and this includes Sjahrir and his civil officers. Of course at present we cannot go beyond the perimeter even with military escorts in strength. 5. However, Sjahrir has agreed to take any particular steps I indicate, and was so despondent about the matter and Indonesian repute in Australian eyes that I thought I would test him by asking if he would be willing to offer a gratuitous but substantial payment of compensation to the relatives of the deceased officers without either awaiting the final result of the investigations or slackening his efforts to locate the perpetrators. 6. Sjahrir said he would only too gladly make such an offer if the Australian Government would accept it, and expressed a wish that if it did the money should go to the relatives in addition to any moneys ordinarily payable by the Australian Government, but said this was purely a personal desire and that this should be for the Australian Government's decision. 7. Sjahrir left for the interior this morning, but left a draft letter and authority for it to be signed if I would receive it, and said he would gladly make any amendments that would make it more acceptable to the Australian Government. 8. The letter, in typical Indonesian English, is addressed to me and reads:- To His Honor judge Kirby, Australian Mission, Djakarta. Acting on behalf and by order of Mr. Sutan Sjahrir, Prime Minister of the Indonesian Government, I have the honour to inform you as follows: Mr. Sjahrir should like to express again his sincere regret and that of the Indonesian Government with the murder of the three Australian officers near Bogor. He is still doing his utmost to get the Indonesians involved in that murder captured. Conditions have grown so bad, however, that it will cost much time before they will be seized. Mr. Sjahrir should like to assure you that when the said persons will be seized, the strongest measures will be taken against them, and, if you desire, they will be delivered to the Allied Forces. He begs for your kindness to forward this to your Government. He begs you too to forward his condolence with the death of the officers to the relations of the defunct. Mr. Sjahrir should like to emphasize that the Indonesian Government is most anxious to compensate the relations of the deceased officers, and would be very happy if your Government would accept on their behalf compensation from the Indonesian Government. Mr. Sjahrir is anxious for you to understand that this offer is made with a wish to atone so far as is humanly possible and not in any manner to avoid or delay joint action with you in bringing the criminals to proper justice. I am, Sir, Yours sincerely, 9. No amount was mentioned but if the idea is acceptable to you I had in mind one thousand pounds sterling or two thousand Australian in each case as an appropriate amount. 10. For your consideration my opinion is that the offer is a sincere one and worthy of acceptance, which would not, I think, in any way lower Australia's dignity or her firm stand in this matter. 11. Could I have instructions please, as if the offer is acceptable details will have to be arranged, draft letter settled, and amount and method of payment fixed. [4]
1 On' 17 April, during an investigation of Japanese war crimes, three Australians from 1st Australian War Crimes Detachment, S.E.A.C., were murdered near Buitenzorg, Java. See Volume IX, Document 196. 2 Tentara Republik Indonesia, the Army of the Republic of Indonesia. 3 On 27 June Sjahrir and several others had been kidnapped by an armed band at Solo while en route to Batavia to resume discussions with Van Meek. They were released on 1 July. 4 Cablegram 71 of 5 July asked for confirmation that no Indonesians had been held under arrest in connection with the murders and advised that the External Affairs Dept had had no opportunity yet to consult Evatt regarding the question of compensation. [AA:A4355/2, 5/1]



31 Kirby to Evatt and Dunk_10~31
31 Kirby to Evatt and Dunk
Cablegram 170 BATAVIA, 20 July 1946
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Reference my telegram 163. [1] I saw Sjahrir last night who handed me the documents set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 each dated 18th July and addressed to me and signed by Soekarno as President, Sjahrir as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Sjarifoeddin as Minister for Defence. 2. The signing of the documents by Soekarno and Sjarifoeddin demonstrates Sjahrir's standing with them, as well as the formal agreement to trial by a British Military Court in Batavia. 3. Sjahrir is now leaving again for the interior intending to stay away from Batavia for ten days, but when I told him I would be leaving before this he said he would interrupt his journey and return to Batavia to see me before I left, and that he would use every possible endeavour to enable me to leave for Australia with the suspects [held] in custody [here] [2] 4. This leaves me well pleased with the results of my journey to Djokjakarta, and from signals I have sighted here I think it is only a matter of SAC informing the Foreign Office that there is no military objection to trial by a British Military Court for such a Court to be set up. I am confident that SAC will on Mansergh's advice, also MacKereth's, so advise Foreign Office. 5. His Honour judge R. C. Kirby. On behalf of the Republic of Indonesia we the undersigned hand to you on behalf of the Commonwealth of Australia the complete files of original documents compiled officially as records of the various inquiries and investigations made into the very much regretted death of the three Australian officers at Tjaringin near Bogor on April 17th, 1946. We also on behalf of our Republic repeat the earlier assurances made to you that the men apparently responsible for the crime will be handed over for trial by a British tribunal in Djakarta when such tribunal is ready to try them. You will understand that we could not possibly agree to the men being tried by a Dutch court or a court on which Dutch officers sit. We would prefer that Australians comprise the court and hope that this can be arranged. The names of the men appear in the file handed to you with this document and for purposes of complete understanding are: BOESTAMI, SOEBADRI, SOEPARDI, OEHO and KOESTIMAN. We wish to make it clear that we are anxious to demonstrate our complete co-operation with you in your efforts to bring the perpetrators of the outrage to justice. On behalf of the Republic of Indonesia. 6. His Honour judge Kirby. We thank you for the opportunity you have given us of discussing with you at our capital the speediest method of bringing the criminals concerned in the murder of the Australian officers to justice in a manner satisfactory to our respective peoples. As we have stated to you we accept only a British tribunal in Jakarta, on which of course no Dutch shall take part, as being the most satisfactory manner of showing the world that justice has been done. You will have been aware of the recent disorders organized by a small group of irresponsible men and diverted against our Government. During these disorders the unauthorized release of those implicated in the murder took place and we are taking the speediest steps to re-arrest them. We assure you that the release was effected without our knowledge or authority by elements in our community who do not appreciate our keen desire to have and maintain the friendship of the Australian people.
1 Dispatched 19 July, this cablegram reported Kirby's talks in Djokjakarta with Sjarifoeddin over obtaining a written undertaking to re-arrest escapees believed responsible for the murder of three Australian officers on 17 April. 2 The words in square brackets were handwritten on the version cited. Kirby was to leave for Australia on 27 July, with B. T. Ballard co replace him as Australian Political Representative in the Netherlands East Indies. [AA:A4355/2, 5/1]


336 Burton to Evatt_11~336
336 Burton to Evatt
Cablegram E11 Canberra, 17 September 1947, 2.25 p.m. Immediate Secret Personal
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Eaton seems to have made favourable impression both on Indonesians and Dutch and was entertained at dinner at the Palace and his suggestion of a permanent representative at Djokjakarta was sympathetically received. The joint report will be compiled on conclusions reached on all separate reports and these separate reports will be attached to the joint report. Work on report will commence next Monday.2. Van Zeeland has apparently been nominated by Belgium. In middle thirties, Zeeland was responsible for some woolly but equally liberal economic proposals for Europe. Our nomination should be announced as soon as possible and, apart from suggestions already made [1], Justice Reed of Adelaide, assisted by Kerr, or even a member of the Department, might be a good choice. Another possibility is Simpson. Foster proves to be not available and Prime Minister anxious for suggestions.
1 See Document 333. In a cablegram sent to Evatt on 11 September, Burton had also advised that Chifley considered Justice R. C. Kirby could not be made available to serve as Australia's representative on the Committee of Three. On 15 September, in reply to Document 333, Evatt nonetheless expressed a preference for the nomination of Kirby who had visited Java in June July 1946 to investigate the murder of three Australian military officers. For documents relating to this incident and Kirby's visit to Java, see Volumes IX and X. [AA:A9420/1, 2]

Vichy New Caledonia 1940

HMAS ADELAIDE
After the capitulation of France, the Vichy Government made a very strong bid to establish a Vichy regime in New Caledonia despite a predominant Free French following amongst the population. Australia was very interested in this move, as the threat of having a hostile population in a covering position on the east coast of Australia was very serious, and one which could not be tolerated.When the British Commissioner and High Commissioner arrived at Noumea on 30 August they found that the Military Commandant had taken the place of the French Governor, and that the sloop DUMONT D'URVILLE was in port with a pro-Vichy Captain in command. The commissioners found that no De Gaulle Committee had been formed, although the majority of the people were for De Gaulle. ADELAIDE arrived at Vila (New Hebrides) on 7 September 1940 and remained there until 16 September when she departed for Noumea escorting the Norwegian tanker NORDEN. Aboard NORDEN was the Temporary Governor of New Caledonia, Commissioner-General of Western Pacific and High Commissioner of New Hebrides appointed as such by General De Gaulle.ADELAIDE and NORDEN arrived at Noumea on 19 September to find that the pro-Vichy authorities had practically declared martial law, and that the city was full of the De Gaulle supporters. The crowd, which numbered several thousand, marched to Government House and demanded the Governor's resignation in favour of the De Gaulle appointee. The Governor finally agreed to permit the new appointee to land, which he did at noon, and ADELAIDE withdrew to patrol off the harbour entrance, with the object of inspiring confidence ashore, exercising restraint on DUMONT D'URVILLE, and maintaining mobility.The crowd escorted the De Gaulle appointee to Government House, and after consultation it was agreed that the pro-Vichy Military Governor would hand over at 1500 on 19 September. After protracted negotiations and much diplomacy, DUMONT D'URVILLE sailed for Indo-China on 25 September 1940 and the situation ashore gradually became normal. ADELAIDE departed Noumea in October and arrived back in Sydney on 8 October 1940.

130 Captain H. A. Showers, Commanding Officer of H.M.A.S. Adelaide, to Commonwealth Naval Board Naval signal 0357Z/21 NOUMEA, 21 September 1940, 3.57 a.m. Received 21 September 1940, 6.21 a.m. IMPORTANT Have received formal protest from 'DUMONT D'URVILLE' claiming violation of French territorial waters. Have replied ship remains at official request of Government of New Caledonia and cannot agree that under present circumstances any violation of neutral rights is involved. SAUTOT [1] has informed British Consul [2] that he expects written reply by 0400 Z to his request that 'DUMONT D'URVILLE' depart from Noumea at 0700 Z today Saturday. Situation ashore still unstable mainly due to presence of 'DUMONT D'URVILLE' and lack of any military officer above rank of Lieutenant to give active assistance to SAUTOT.FRENCH CONTROL 1940: SIGNALS ACNB-ADELAIDE] 1 Free French Governor of New Caledonia. 2 W. A. Johnston.

133 Department of External Affairs to Mr B. C. Ballard, Official Representative in New CaledoniaCablegram 23 23 September 1940, IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET[This document has been corrected from a slightly revised version contained in teleprinter message 1918 of 23 September on file AA:A981, New Caledonia 1, iv.] Reference Admiralty message for Sautot dated 22nd September, 1940 [1], sent through [H.M.A.S.] Adelaide, the situation so far as has been reported to us, appears to be deteriorating and requires prompt measures to eliminate those factors which are jeopardising the stability of colony and its whole-hearted adhesion to Free France. It is requested therefore that you interview immediately Sautot [2] and place before him the following on behalf of the Commonwealth Government. (1) In the opinion of the Commonwealth Government Colonel Denis should be deported at the earliest practicable moment. (2) Other elements in the armed forces who are followers of Denis or who are likely to provide leaders in the case of an attempted Vichy coup, should be interned immediately, and the extremists among them should be deported. (3) A staunch officer should be appointed temporarily to command the local forces without waiting for any special officer from Tahiti or elsewhere. (4) Sautot should ask Captain of Adelaide [3] forthwith for protection against any attempt to interfere with the internal control or administration of the colony or against any vessel hostile to Free France already in or proceeding to New Caledonia. (5) You are to inform Sautot that if he asks for the protection mentioned in paragraph 4, the Captain of the Adelaide will be instructed immediately to give it. [4]1 On file AA:A981, New Caledonia 37. It transmitted orders from General Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French movement, that Denis (former Governor and military commander), de Quievrecourt (commanding officer of the Vichy sloop Dumont d'Urville) and all other dangerous opponents of the Free French movement should be interned or deported. 2 Free French Governor of New Caledonia. 3 Captain H. A. Showers. 4 Showers reported on 24 September: 'Situation now practically stable. DUMONT D'URVILLE sails for Saigon on receipt of provisions tomorrow Wednesday. All Vichy adherents now under restraint in PIERRE LOTI anchored harbour.' See teleprinter message D339 on file AA:A981, New Caledonia 37.[AA:A981, NEW CALEDONIA 1, iv]

.. a tribute to the honour of the Turks.

CHAPTER XLII - EAST OF JORDAN - awm.gov.au
[Note the above links to is a pdf file which needs Adobe Acrobat]
Ryrie joined Cameron
726 SINAI AND PALESTINE [28th Sept., 1918
just before dark. “
The 5th Regiment,” wrote Richardson afterwards, “ were concentrated, waiting reinforcements, while the Turks in their trenches were standing to arms holding off the Arabs with shell and machine-gun fire. The vulture appearance of the Arabs, who were willing that we should do the fighting and they the looting, will not readily be forgotten.”
On Ryrie’s arrival many of the chiefs at once crowded about him, urging him to attack and promising him bold co-operation. But the old Australian campaigner knew the fighting quality of his faint-hearted allies. He shared with the Turks the fear that, if they gave up their arms, his weak force might not he able to guard them against the Arabs. He therefore took the bold decision, but the only one open to him, to join forces with the Turks for the night and trust for developments in the morning. After advising the Turks of his intention, and ordering two of the sheikhs to accompany him, he led his two regiments at the gallop through the ring of Arabs into the heart of the Turkish position. He then told the Turks that they were to retain their arms and continue to hold their trenches against the tribesmen, while the light horsemen would stand by in support. At the same time he impressed upon the two Arab sheikhs that, if their men attacked in the night, they themselves would immediately be shot. The sheikhs sent out messengers to inform their followers of this threat, and the Turks and Australians proceeded, after years of bitter fighting, to bivouac together They gathered allout the same fires, exchanging their food, making chappaties together, and by many signs expressing reciprocal respect and admiration. The Australians, although outnumbered eight to one, had no concern for their safety, and the confidence with which they moved about the armed lines was a tribute to the honour of the Turks. Perhaps in all
28th-29th Sept., 1918] EAST OF JORDAN 727
their campaigning the light horsemen were never so richly entertained. The Turks, demoralised by the swift and complete overthrow of their fortunes, and disconcerted by the presence of the Australians, still feared massacre hy the Arabs; all night they stood to arms, and engaged in bursts of machine-gun and rifle fire. The light horsemen, revelling in the strange situation, could be heard cheering on their activities. " Go on, Jacko," they would shout, " give it to the blighters "-and then indulge in shouts of laughter, cut short by the splutter of the machine-guns and the crackle of the rifles. What was grim tragedy to the Turks was farce to the Australians.
The Arabs showed no disposition to close, and soon after dawn Ryrie was able to assure the Turkish leader that additional troops were marching down from Amman to guard his men after their surrender. The New Zealand Brigade arrived at 8 o'clock; and the Turks, with the exception of a few hundred who were employed to assist the escort, laid down their arms and were marched to Amman. The anger and disgust of the Arabs was boundless. Insensible to chivalry, and instinctively cruel, they claimed the Turks and their booty to deal with in their own fashion. The prisoners numbered about 5,000, and the trophies included thirteen field and mountain guns, more than thirty machine-guns, a great quantity of ammunition, one large railway train, and three engines.
In this dramatic and picturesque fashion ended Chaytor's fine campaign east of Jordan. In nine days his force had captured 10,300 prisoners and 57 guns, 132 machine-guns, 11 railway engines and 106 trucks, and a great quantity of material - including wireless-sets, motor-lorries and other vehicles, and ammunition. His casualties were slight. Three officers and twenty-four other ranks were killed, ten officers and ninety-five other ranks wounded, and seven men posted missing-a total of 139.

Karl R. Bendetson, October 24, 1972

Oral History Interview with Karl R. Bendetson New York City, New York October 24, 1972 Jerry N. Hess
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/oral_his.htm
It was during that service in August of 1941, five months before Pearl Harbor, that a crisis event took place in the House of Representatives. The Selective Service Act of August 16, 1940 would expire on August 16, 1941 if not extended by congressional action. The Senate had voted for extension in a relatively close vote. In the House there were great pressures to let the Act die. Most people have probably forgotten how some of the draftees and many others were behaving in those days. Draft cards were publicly burned. There were riots. There was a concerted effort to end the draft. It was a "rehearsal" for the anti-Vietnam demonstrations.

Cobra and the Gap

After D-Day in 1944
North France World War II US Army
First there was Operation COBRA then the failure to close the Argentan-Falaise gap can be blamed on lack of communication that resulted from growing jealousies within the coalition.

D-Day The Invasion Is Launched Crisis

The Sixth of June
Cross-Channel Attack
The Airborne Assault
The time and place at least of the "large-scale landing" caught the Germans wholly by surprise.
Hitting the Beaches
While U.S. airborne troops dropped on the Cotentin and British paratroopers landed near Caen, the invasion fleet was bringing the main body of the Allied armies to the shores of Normandy.
In these first few hours on OMAHA Beach, the OVERLORD operation faced its gravest crisis.