US Army - World War II - Civil Affairs

Recent events have been portrayed as something new. As the below shows nothing has changed in war-torn countries.
Foreword
In the midst of the large-scale combat operations of World War II, the Army was called on to occupy, to govern, and to help rehabilitate complex, war-torn countries and economies. Few of its task turned out to be as difficult and challenging as these civil affairs missions. They were beset by the problems of resolving conflicting national interests and of reconciling political idealism and military exigency. On another level-in feeding hungry populations, in tackling intricate financial and economic problems, and in protecting the cultural heritage of a rich and ancient civilization-they had to exercise skills that are also normally considered civilian rather than military.
Chapter I: Soldiers-Governors
Should Soldiers Be Governors?
The story of civil affairs in World War II as it emerges from the documents reveals the effort to perform a mission unprecedented in complexity and size. The mission called for military, political, and economic activity on every level - from the job of rebuilding a village bakery to that of rooting out and replacing Fascist and Nazi ideology and institutions. They are highlighted, on a lower plane, in an officer's problems on first entering a Sicilian town "And what a lot of headaches I found. Water supply damaged. No power. No food. No fuel, and corpses all over town to bury."
Chapter II: French North Africa
French North Africa
At the time of operation TORCH, the invasion of North Africa, the most important civil affairs issue seemed to be the politically dramatic problem of the Darlan Deal and the apparent compromise of political principle which it involved. Many were unfavorably impressed by the military role in this issue, which seemed to place the Army on the side of political opportunism if not of worse.
Chapter XXI: Interdependence Precludes an Easy Way Out
The posthostilities occupation of Italy
The posthostilities occupation of Italy lasted more than two and a half years longer than the military campaign itself. No one, least of all the military commanders, foresaw or desired that the Allies would be forced to delay their exit so long. The explanation of the delay involves a factor more political than military. Clearly, it was impossible for the Allies to withdraw from Italy until the victors had agreed among themselves on the terms of peace. It is also clear that by the end of the war both the United States and Great Britain had a keen sense of what Assistant Secretary of War McCloy termed "a long-term interest" in Italy, or a recognition of interdependence between Italy and the Allies in the now emerging conflict between the West and the police states. This development made it seem inadvisable to agree forthwith to the very severe terms which both the Soviet and Yugoslavia soon showed it was their intention to impose upon Italy. Not to have tried hard and long to mitigate the severity would have alienated Italy.
Chapter XXX: Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Wake of Battle
Refugees
The care and disposition of refugees and displaced persons was one of the most perplexing of civil affairs problems. Though the problem had many ramifications some of the principal difficulties arose from certain false assumptions. In the planning stage the civil affairs staffs were obliged to proceed on very meager intelligence as to the nature and extent of the problem.