CHAPTER XII The Rhineland Campaign, 1945
army.mil/cmh
Famine lurked in the unplowed fields. Military government told the Germans that what they expected to eat during the next winter they would have to raise themselves. For what it was worth, the armies ordered the troops not to use local food, and military government tried to persuade the foreign workers to stay on the farms. In a more practical vein, SHAEF instructed the army groups to restrict the farmers' movements as little as possible. As a result, most units limited the curfew to the hours between sunset and sunrise, and in the Landkreise many allowed free circulation throughout the Kreis during daylight. The speed of the drive to the Rhine brought one unexpected dividend : the retreating Germans did not have time to get all their horses across the river. By the end of the the armies had rounded up several thousand and were turning them over to the farmers. Under the pressure of the war and existing policy restrictions, military government could not do more. To provide f or acute emergencies and for the displaced persons, 12th Army Group moved 80,000 tons of relief supplies into Germany during March; by the end of the month Third Army alone had issued over 7,000 long tons of food to displaced persons.
Wednesday, January 04, 2006
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