Singapore and Corregidor - A Tale of Two Plans

A factor which had some effect on morale generally was that, strategically, we were on the defensive; everyone knew that it was to our interests to avoid war with Japan, which meant that the initiative and especially choice of moment for opening hostilities rested with them. As stated above, the 'Matador plan provided for a tactical offensive, provided-adequate warning could be obtained. As events turned out, the execution of Matador was impracticable, and later events confirmed that the decision not to carry out this operation was correct.

Then, owing to the comparative weakness of our forces in Malaya we could neither afford heavy losses up North nor send up there more than limited reinforcements, because of the necessity for retaining a force to defend Southern Johore and in the last resort the island of Singapore itself. This was not the result of a sort of fortress-complex, but because the essential factor was preservation of the repair and other facilities in the Naval Base. The opinion held in London on this point was made perfectly clear in the latter part of December when the Chiefs of Staff telegraphed:
"'His Majesty's Government agree your conception that vital issue is to ensure security of Singapore Naval Base. They emphasise that no other consideration - must compete with this."

Holding Northern Malaya was not an end in itself; it was with reference to the Naval Base that Northern Malaya acquired its importance. This meant that Commanders in the North had to bear in mind the possibility of withdrawal in the face of superior forces, . their action - at any rate until Johore was reached - being mainly a delaying one to gain time for the arrival of reinforcements from overseas.

The matter was further advanced at a conference called by Brooke-Popham in August 1941,and a plan — with the code-name MATADOR — for the occupation of the Singora-Patani area to forestall the Japanese, was adopted. The British Chiefs of Staff, however, while agreeing that an advance into the Kra Isthmus would be the best counter to a Japanese overland threat to Malaya, pointed out that there could be no question of Allied forces operating in Thailand before that country had been invaded by the Japanese. There could be no sanction beforehand to an advance to Singora from Malaya, and MATADOR could not be implemented without reference to Whitehall. When, however, on the 5th December, the American assurance of armed support was at last received, the Chiefs of Staff authorised Brooke-Popham to order MATADOR without further reference to them should the Japanese violate any part of Thailand, or if there were good information that a Japanese expedition was advancing with the apparent intention of landing on the Kra Isthmus.
As Brooke-Popham later wrote:
Bearing in mind the policy of avoiding war with Japan if possible — a policy which had been reaffirmed by the Chiefs of Staff as recently as the 29th November — and the situation in the United States with the Kurusu talks still going on in Washington, I decided that I would not be justified in ordering MATADOR on this information. 6
6 Brooke-Popham, Despatch on Operations in the Far East, from 17th October 1940 to 27th December 1941.

At about midnight that night, without formal declaration of war, Japanese forces invaded northern Malaya from the sea, and Thailand from the sea and from Indo-China. Almost simultaneously they struck the American Pacific Fleet a devastating blow in Pearl Harbour with bombs and torpedoes from carrier-borne aircraft; and a few hours later made air attacks on the Philippine Islands. Full scale war, with its direct threat to Australia, had come to the Far East.

The expected blow from Japan fell with unexpected suddenness with the raiding of Pearl Harbour on 7th December. At the same time Japanese planes bombed Kota Bharu, Singgora and Patani. Enemy raiders were detected thirty-five miles north east of Mersing but through bad liaison warning was not given to Singapore, which presented an illuminated target for a raid in which there were sixty people killed. Warning for movement had been given to the 11th Indian Division in accordance with the plan known as "Matador", which was designed to prevent and intercept enemy landings in Singgora. There were politico-military implications in a plan involving the entry of Thailand, but when movement was made it was too late for the plan to be fully implemented. The Japanese had a large convoy of transports off the east coast, and made landings at Singgora and later at Kota Bharu. The Indian troops encountered unexpected resistance from the Thais, and were unable to reach a position known as the "ledge", inside the Thailand border.
Meanwhile the Japanese bombed airfields on the west coast of Malaya, at Alor Star and Sungei Patani,and by 10th December Japanese ground troops had swiftly advanced and inflicted heavy casualties on the British and Indian troops. The Japanese advance now assumed the form of a three-pronged drive, pressing south along the east coast from Kota Bharu, advancing down the centre of the peninsula, and pouring towards the west coast where they engaged the forces defending Jitra. It was soon evident that the greatest danger was on the west coast in North Kedah. The Indian field ambulances which had been held in readiness for the advance into Thailand were evacuating casualties to the 5th Indian C.C.S. at Bedong, and on the central front where "Krohcol" was operating, the 2/3rd Australian M.A.C. under Major Dick was assisting in transport of wounded, although no Australians were at that time in action. Practically all the transport of wounded both in front of and behind the field ambulances was done by this unit.
On 10th December the battleships Prince of Wales and Repulse, which had recently arrived, while seeking an invasion flotilla off Kuantan on the east coast of the peninsula, were attacked and sunk by Japanese torpedo bombers. This tragic loss emphasised the lack of air cover and the risk of further enemy landings.

Remembering 1942
The very speed and apparent ease of the Japanese victory was a major factor in the severe impact that this event had, both in Britain and Australia. For Singapore was supposed to have been an impregnable fortress, and had stood for many years as a potent symbol of British power in South-East Asia. Since the construction of a great naval base at Singapore began in the 1920s, Australian governments had been wedded to this (and the strategy of imperial defence that it encapsulated) as the lynchpin of Australian defence policy also.
In the event, Australians discovered too late that the fundamentals of the policy upon which reliance had been placed were unsound. Britain had promised to provide a fleet for the base, whenever needed to deter Japanese aggression, initially within six weeks although this was extended to three months in 1939. When that situation finally arose in November 1941, a matter of weeks before Japan struck at Pearl Harbor and elsewhere around the Asia-Pacific region, Britain was already heavily committed in Europe and had few ships to spare. What arrived early in December was not a great fleet but a small squadron based around just two capital ships, Prince of Wales and Repulse (one very new, the other quite old). Both big ships were quickly disposed of a few days later by the Japanese in the opening hours of their invasion of Malaya.

Sea communications were the vital factor. The fleet, unbalanced though it was, was the one weapon with which so damaging a blow could at that time have been dealt the Japanese as to have affected their plans and, possibly, the fate of Malaya. As such it should have been given the highest priority in air defence, to the exclusion of all other considerations.
Remembering 1942
Singapore thus remained without the fleet that was its primary rationale. Worse than this, planning for the base had called for roughly between 350 and 550 aircraft to defend it from the air. But this requirement had never been met, either in the number of aircraft provided or effective types. Despite the best efforts of Malaya's aerial defenders, including three squadrons from the Royal Australian Air Force, Singapore found itself at the mercy of an enemy that was vastly superior in air power.
Remembering 1942
To oppose the three divisions which the Japanese deployed in their campaign against Malaya and Singapore, Percival mainly had an Indian corps of two divisions and the Australian 8th Division under Major-General Gordon Bennett. Ordinarily, military doctrine requires that an attacker needs a superiority of several times the strength of the defender for success to be achievable, but in this case such a margin was unnecessary considering the freedom the Japanese enjoyed in deploying forces and manoeuvring them. The Indian troops were outclassed by the Japanese, and although the Australians, once committed to action in Johore on 14 January, achieved the few allied successes of the campaign (at places such as Gemas, Bakri, Jemaluang and Muar River), the 8th Division was understrength with just two brigades and lost heavily over the course of the next fortnight's fighting. It has been claimed in a contemporary British report finally released in 1992 that it was acts of indiscipline by Australian troops in these chaotic circumstances which undermined the British defence and directly contributed to the surrender. Acts of indiscipline there almost certainly were, on the part of some personnel - not all of whom would have been Australian. Such behaviour is typical of many such military situations, so there is also nothing especially unusual in that. Considering the underlying weakness in defensive arrangements, however, there can be no doubt as to where the real cause lay for the loss of Singapore.
There are also many popular myths which continue to this day, such as that regarding the fortress guns famously pointed in the wrong direction (when, in fact, nearly all these weapons did engage the Japanese, although there was a shortage of high explosive ammunition).

297 Mr V. G. Bowden, Official Representative in Singapore, to Department of External Affairs Cablegram 69 (extract) SINGAPORE, 23 January 1942, 8.54 p.m. IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET (7) General Officer Commanding Malaya [1] is forming a special staff under General Officer Commanding Fortress (Keith Simmons) to make final preparations for defence of Singapore Island. (8) Keith Simmons reveals to me that all fixed defences Singapore
Island are directed seawards. None are directed towards mainland. His defence armament nevertheless appears strong but his garrison has been weakened by withdrawals to reinforce troops on mainland. BOWDEN
1 Lt Gen A. E. Percival.

The ORANGE Plan
The first ORANGE plans were hardly plans at all but rather statements of principles, which, it was hoped, could be followed in the event of war with Japan.
"At one time," wrote Capt. Harry E. Yarnell, one of the Navy planners, "it was the plan of the Navy Department to send a fleet to the Philippines on the outbreak of war. I am sure that this would not be done at the present time . . . it seems certain that in the course of time the Philippines and whatever forces we may have there will be captured."
Thus, the primary mission of the Philippine Department in the ORANGE plan was to hold Manila Bay.

The concept of "an offensive war, primarily naval" was firmly embodied in the plan finally evolved. From it stemmed the emphasis placed on sea power and a naval base in the Philippines. The first concern of the United States in a war with Japan and the initial mission of the Army and Navy, declared the Joint Planners, would be to establish sea power in the western Pacific "in strength superior to that of Japan." This, they recognized, would require a "main outlying base" in that region. Manila Bay, it was acknowledged, best met the requirements for such a base and its retention would be essential in the event of hostilities. Thus, the primary mission of the Philippine Department in the ORANGE plan was to hold Manila Bay.

In 1933 when General Embick, then a brigadier, was commanding the harbor defenses of Manila Bay, he wrote his protests against serious reliance upon the Orange Plan of that day, because of twenty-five years' "progressive weakening of our military position in the Philippine islands." He proceeded:
As a result the Philippine Islands have become a military liability of a constantly increasing gravity. To carry out the present Orange Plan-with its provisions for the early dispatch of our fleet to Philippine waters-would be literally an act of madness. No milder term can be employed if facts are squarely to be faced. In the event of an Orange War the best that could be hoped for would be that wise counsels would prevail, that our people would acquiesce in the temporary loss of the Philippines, and that the dispatch of our battle fleet to the Far East would be delayed for two or three years needed for its augmentation....

Germany First
Considering the importance of the Atlantic to American security, Stark argued strongly against major commitments in the far Pacific that would involve the United States in an all-out effort against Pacific such as war envisaged in ORANGE. Such a course would have the effect of drawing resources away from the Atlantic and cutting down aid to Britain. Even a limited war against Japan would require strong reinforcements in the southwest Pacific and southeast Asia to defend British and Dutch possessions. Also, it might prove very difficult indeed to prevent a limited war from becoming unlimited, as the Japanese later found out. Nor did Stark see how the defeat of Japan, even if this could be accomplished, would contribute materially to the more important objectives of the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the continued existence of the British Empire. To perform all the tasks required to achieve there objectives, the United States could "do little more in the Pacific than remain on a strict defensive."

No military plan for the defense of an archipelago such as the Philippine Islands could have had serious prospects of success against a determined enemy with a powerful fleet without great reliance on more effective naval support than that provided by patrol boats. The Philippine Government had neither the industrial capacity nor the wealth to build and support a navy which could compete with that of a first class naval power. President Quezon had frankly admitted this in November 1935. Such naval support could come only from the United States. No provision, it is true, had been made in the Tydings-McDuffie Act for the use by the U.S. Navy of naval bases in the Islands after 1946. But such a possibility had not been specifically denied and it was undoubtedly believed that arrangements for their use would be made at a later date. Certainly, the Philippine Government did not anticipate that the United States would stand idly by if the security of the Philippines was threatened.

In prewar plans, the Philippine garrison had been assigned the mission of holding Manila Bay for an indefinite period, presumed to be six months. Though few responsible officers believed the fleet could fight its way through to Manila Bay in that time, the ORANGE plans made no provision for any other contingency, such as the recapture of the Philippines. Thus, according to these old plans, when the fleet reached Manila Bay with its reinforcements it would find the bay in friendly hands, available as a base for further operations.
It was this plan, modified and placed in the context of a global struggle in which Germany was the main enemy and Europe the main theater, that was in effect on the morning of 7 December. But the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor altered completely the balance of forces in the Pacific and rendered obsolete the ORANGE. concept of a Central Pacific offensive. The Navy would have enough to do defending the Hawaiian outpost and the west coast of the United States. Guam, Wake, and the Philippines lay beyond reach and all hopes for an early offensive into the Mandates lay at the bottom of the bay with the battleships of the Pacific Fleet. Until this loss was replaced and the Pacific Fleet strengthened, the Navy would have to husband its resources and fight a defensive war.

The proposed operation was given the code-name MATADOR. They estimated that British forces established round Singora would be liable to attack by one division advancing overland from Bangkok and a maximum of two landed from the sea; and decided that a force of three brigade group s supported by six air force squadrons would be needed to take and hold the Singora area. British officers in plain clothes reconnoitred the area; they met Japanese officers, also in plain clothes, doing the same thing.

The fact that the main Japanese landings were at Singora and Patani had been revealed in the course of dawn air reconnaissance on 8th December; and later in the morning many Japanese planes, mostly fighters, were found to be using the Singora airfield. The Japanese had forestalled Operation MATADOR, for which the troops of the 11th Indian Division had been standing by at half an hour's notice in drenching rain since the afternoon of 6th December. As the division was disposed, with three battalions beside trains, two in camp with their trucks loaded, and one forward near the frontier, they were ill prepared for any other move. There they remained, despite what was happening, and endeavours to obtain authority from Malaya Command for action, until about 1.30 p.m. Then, when vital hours had been lost, orders which had been issued at 11.30 a.m. reached III Indian Corps headquarters requiring it to adopt the alternative plan and occupy selected defensive positions on the Singora and Kroh-Patani roads, and to dispatch a mobile column towards Singora, in an endeavour to obstruct the Japanese advance. The 28th Indian Brigade was allotted to the 11th Division as a reserve force, an d entrained at Ipoh at 5 p.m. That such a restricted manoeuvre was all that remained of the dynamic plan to move into Thailand was naturally dispiriting to the troops and their commanders. Even this might be fore-stalled by the enemy; and the men would be tired and confused before they could give battle. The main defensive line now to be held, running from east of Jitra to the west coast, was in the State of Kedah, astride the main road and railway from Malaya into Thailand. Its right flank rested on jungle-clad hills which had been considered by the planners of Malaya's defence system to be militarily impenetrable.

In the failure to order an air offensive against Formosa that morning General Headquarters had created a situation that was comparable with that in Malaya when General Headquarters there decided not to order the MATADOR operation. The basic reason appears to have been the same.

Plans for the defense of the Philippine Islands had been in existence for many years when General MacArthur returned to active duty. The latest revision of these plans, completed in April 1941 and called WPO-3, was based on the joint Army-Navy ORANGE plan of 1938, one of the many "color" plans developed during the prewar years. Each color plan dealt with a different situation, ORANGE covering an emergency in which only the United States and Japan would be involved. In this sense, the plan was politically unrealistic and completely outdated by 1941. Tactically, however, the plan was an excellent one and its provisions for defense were applicable under any local situation.
Rather it was the quality not the quantity of his troops that was responsible for the failure to halt the Japanese.
As events turned out, a deviation from Yamashita's plans - a deviation that illustrates his command and control problems - served to deny the use of Manila Bay to the Allies for some time. Contrary to Yamashita's orders, a force of some 17,000 troops under naval command elected to defend Manila, and held out until 3 March 1945. Salvage, repair, and construction problems in the bay area were of such magnitude that it was well into April before the Allies could profit by Manila's port facilities. Thus, directly or indirectly, the Japanese prevented the Allies from employing Manila Bay for roughly three months after MacArthur's initial landings on Luzon on 9 January 1945, as compared to the five months that MacArthur's and Wainwright's forces, by their stands on Bataan and on Corregidor, had denied the bay to the Japanese three years earlier. Yamashita's groupment west of Clark Field remained a threat for a little over a month after 9 January. The Japanese in the mountains east and northeast of Manila retained their hold over Manila's water supply for nearly five months.
Wainwright's forces, by their stands on Bataan and on Corregidor, had denied the bay to the Japanese three years earlier. Yamashita's groupment west of Clark Field remained a threat for a little over a month after 9 January. The Japanese in the mountains east and northeast of Manila retained their hold over Manila's water supply for nearly five months.
In 1942, American resistance on Luzon, except for minor, isolated forces, ended on 9 April, almost four months to the day after the initial Japanese attacks against the Philippines. Corregidor lasted one more month. In 1945, Yamashita's main force did better. Holed up in the mountain fastnesses of northern Luzon, it was still resisting when Japan surrendered, seven and a half months after MacArthur's initial landings, and Yamashita estimated he could have continued the fight in those northern mountains for another month.
Who made the wiser decision-MacArthur or Yamashita?